United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ___ (2024) (2024)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formalerrors.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–915_________________UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEYRAHIMIon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the fifth circuit[June 21, 2024]Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion ofthe Court.A federal statute prohibits an individualsubject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing afirearm if that order includes a finding that he “represents acredible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,”or a child of the partner or individual. 18 U.S.C.§922(g)(8). Respondent Zackey Rahimi is subject to such an order.The question is whether this provision may be enforced against himconsistent with the Second Amendment.IAIn December 2019, Rahimi met his girlfriend,C.M., for lunch in a parking lot. C.M. is also themother of Rahimi’s young child, A.R. During the meal, Rahimiand C.M. began arguing, and Rahimi became enraged. Brief forUnited States 2. C.M. attempted to leave, but Rahimi grabbedher by the wrist, dragged her back to his car, and shoved her in,causing her to strike her head against the dashboard. When herealized that a bystander was watching the altercation, Rahimipaused to retrieve a gun from under the passenger seat. C.M.took advantage of the opportunity to escape. Rahimi fired as shefled, although it is unclear whether he was aiming at C.M. orthe witness. Rahimi later called C.M. and warned that hewould shoot her if she reported the incident. Ibid.Undeterred by this threat, C.M. went tocourt to seek a restraining order. In the affidavit accompanyingher application, C.M. recounted the parking lot incident aswell as other assaults. She also detailed how Rahimi’s conduct hadendangered A.R. Although Rahimi had an opportunity to contestC.M.’s testimony, he did not do so. On February 5, 2020, astate court in Tarrant County, Texas, issued a restraining orderagainst him. The order, entered with the consent of both parties,included a finding that Rahimi had committed “family violence.”App. 2. It also found that this violence was “likely to occuragain” and that Rahimi posed “a credible threat” to the “physicalsafety” of C.M. or A.R. Id., at 2–3. Based onthese findings, the order prohibited Rahimi from threateningC.M. or her family for two years or contacting C.M.during that period except to discuss A.R. Id., at 3–7.It also suspended Rahimi’s gun license for two years. Id.,at 5–6. If Rahimi was imprisoned or confined when the order was setto expire, the order would instead terminate either one or twoyears after his release date, depending on the length of hisimprisonment. Id., at 6–7.In May, however, Rahimi violated the order byapproaching C.M.’s home at night. He also began contactingher through several social media accounts.In November, Rahimi threatened a different womanwith a gun, resulting in a charge for aggravated assault with adeadly weapon. And while Rahimi was under arrest for that assault,the Texas police identified him as the suspect in a spate of atleast five additional shootings.The first, which occurred in December 2020,arose from Rahimi’s dealing in illegal drugs. After one of hiscustomers “started talking trash,” Rahimi drove to the man’s homeand shot into it. Brief for United States 3. While driving the nextday, Rahimi collided with another car, exited his vehicle, andproceeded to shoot at the other car. Three days later, he fired hisgun in the air while driving through a residential neighborhood. Afew weeks after that, Rahimi was speeding on a highway nearArlington, Texas, when a truck flashed its lights at him. Rahimihit the brakes and cut across traffic to chase the truck. Once offthe highway, he fired several times toward the truck and a nearbycar before fleeing. Two weeks after that, Rahimi and a friend weredining at a roadside burger restaurant. When the restaurantdeclined his friend’s credit card, Rahimi pulled a gun and shotinto the air.The police obtained a warrant to search Rahimi’sresidence. There they discovered a pistol, a rifle, ammunition—anda copy of the restraining order.BRahimi was indicted on one count of possessinga firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order,in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8). At the time, sucha violation was punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment (sinceamended to 15 years). §924(a)(2); see Bipartisan Safer CommunitiesAct, Pub. L. 117–159, §12004(c)(2), 136Stat. 1329, 18U.S.C. §924(a)(8). A prosecution under Section922(g)(8) may proceed only if three criteria are met. First, thedefendant must have received actual notice and an opportunity to beheard before the order was entered. §922(g)(8)(A). Second, theorder must prohibit the defendant from either “harassing, stalking,or threatening” his “intimate partner” or his or his partner’schild, or “engaging in other conduct that would place [the] partnerin reasonable fear of bodily injury” to the partner or child.§922(g)(8)(B). A defendant’s “intimate partner[s]” include hisspouse or any former spouse, the parent of his child, and anyonewith whom he cohabitates or has cohabitated. §921(a)(32). Third,under Section 922(g)(8)(C), the order must either contain a findingthat the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physicalsafety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner’s child,§922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] theuse,” attempted use, or threatened use of “physical force” againstthose individuals, §922(g)(8)(C)(ii).Rahimi’s restraining order met all threecriteria. First, Rahimi had received notice and an opportunity tobe heard before the order was entered. App. 2. Second, the orderprohibited him from communicating with or threatening C.M.Id., at 3–4. Third, the order met the requirements ofSection 922(g)(8)(C)(i), because it included a finding that Rahimirepresented “a credible threat to the physical safety” ofC.M. or her family. Id., at 2–3. The order also“explicitly prohibit[ed]” Rahimi from “the use, attempted use, orthreatened use of physical force” against C.M., satisfyingthe independent basis for liability in Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).Id., at 3.Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguingthat Section 922(g)(8) violated on its face the Second Amendmentright to keep and bear arms. No. 4:21–cr–00083 (ND Tex., May 7,2021), ECF Doc. 17. Concluding that Circuit precedent foreclosedRahimi’s Second Amendment challenge, the District Court denied hismotion. Rahimi then pleaded guilty. On appeal, he again raised hisSecond Amendment challenge. The appeal was denied, and Rahimipetitioned for rehearing en banc.While Rahimi’s petition was pending, this Courtdecided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). In Bruen, we explained thatwhen a firearm regulation is challenged under the Second Amendment,the Government must show that the restriction “is consistent withthe Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”Id., at 24.In light of Bruen, the panel withdrew theprior opinion and ordered additional briefing. A new panel thenheard oral argument and reversed. 61 F.4th 443, 448 (CA52023). Surveying the evidence that the Government had identified,the panel concluded that Section 922(g)(8) does not fit within ourtradition of firearm regulation. Id., at 460–461. Judge Howrote separately to express his view that the panel’s ruling didnot conflict with the interest in protecting people from violentindividuals. Id., at 461–462 (concurring opinion).We granted certiorari. 600 U.S. ___(2023)IIWhen a restraining order contains a findingthat an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safetyof an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with theSecond Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the orderis in effect. Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws haveincluded provisions preventing individuals who threaten physicalharm to others from misusing firearms. As applied to the facts ofthis case, Section 922(g)(8) fits comfortably within thistradition.AWe have held that the right to keep and beararms is among the “fundamental rights necessary to our system ofordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.742, 778 (2010). Derived from English practice and codified inthe Second Amendment, the right secures for Americans a means ofself-defense. Bruen, 597 U.S., at 17. The spark thatignited the American Revolution was struck at Lexington andConcord, when the British governor dispatched soldiers to seize thelocal farmers’ arms and powder stores. In the aftermath of theCivil War, Congress’s desire to enable the newly freed slaves todefend themselves against former Confederates helped inspire thepassage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which secured the right tobear arms against interference by the States. McDonald, 561U.S., at 771–776. As a leading and early proponent ofemancipation observed, “Disarm a community and you rob them of themeans of defending life. Take away their weapons of defense and youtake away the inalienable right of defending liberty.” Cong. Globe,40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1967 (1868) (statement of Rep. Stevens).“Like most rights,” though, “the right securedby the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” District ofColumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570, 626 (2008). In Heller, this Court held that theright applied to ordinary citizens within the home. Even as we didso, however, we recognized that the right was never thought tosweep indiscriminately. “From Blackstone through the 19th-centurycases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the rightwas not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in anymanner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Ibid. At thefounding, the bearing of arms was subject to regulations rangingfrom rules about firearm storage to restrictions on gun use bydrunken New Year’s Eve revelers. Act of Mar. 1, 1783, 1783 Mass.Acts and Laws ch.13, pp. 218–219; 5 Colonial Laws of New York ch.1501, pp. 244–246 (1894). Some jurisdictions banned the carrying of“dangerous and unusual weapons.” 554 U.S., at 627 (citing 4W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 148–149 (1769)).Others forbade carrying concealed firearms. 554 U.S., at626.In Heller, our inquiry into the scope ofthe right began with “constitutional text and history.”Bruen, 597 U.S., at 22. In Bruen, we directedcourts to examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation”to help delineate the contours of the right. Id., at 17. Weexplained that if a challenged regulation fits within thattradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment. We alsoclarified that when the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct,as when the Government regulates other constitutional rights, itbears the burden to “justify its regulation.” Id., at24.Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood themethodology of our recent Second Amendment cases. These precedentswere not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber. As we explainedin Heller, for example, the reach of the Second Amendment isnot limited only to those arms that were in existence at thefounding. 554 U.S., at 582. Rather, it “extends, prima facie,to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those thatwere not [yet] in existence.” Ibid. By that same logic, theSecond Amendment permits more than just those regulations identicalto ones that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be asmistaken as applying the protections of the right only to musketsand sabers.As we explained in Bruen, the appropriateanalysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation isconsistent with the principles that underpin our regulatorytradition. 597 U.S., at 26–31. A court must ascertain whetherthe new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our tradition isunderstood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck bythe founding generation to modern circ*mstances.” Id., at29, and n. 7. Discerning and developing the law in this way is “acommonplace task for any lawyer or judge.” Id., at 28.Why and how the regulation burdens the right arecentral to this inquiry. Id., at 29. For example, if laws atthe founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems,that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposingsimilar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissiblecategory of regulations. Even when a law regulates arms-bearing fora permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with theright if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at thefounding. And when a challenged regulation does not precisely matchits historical precursors, “it still may be analogous enough topass constitutional muster.” Id., at 30. The law mustcomport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but itneed not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.” Ibid.(emphasis deleted).[1]BBearing these principles in mind, we concludethat Section 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s challenge.1Rahimi challenges Section 922(g)(8) on itsface. This is the “most difficult challenge to mount successfully,”because it requires a defendant to “establish that no set ofcirc*mstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” UnitedStates v. Salerno, 481 U.S.739, 745 (1987). That means that to prevail, the Governmentneed only demonstrate that Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional insome of its applications. And here the provision is constitutionalas applied to the facts of Rahimi’s own case.Recall that Section 922(g)(8) provides twoindependent bases for liability. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) bars anindividual from possessing a firearm if his restraining orderincludes a finding that he poses “a credible threat to the physicalsafety” of a protected person. Separately, Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)bars an individual from possessing a firearm if his restrainingorder “prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use ofphysical force.” Our analysis starts and stops with Section922(g)(8)(C)(i) because the Government offers ample evidence thatthe Second Amendment permits the disarmament of individuals whopose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. We neednot decide whether regulation under Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) isalso permissible.2This Court reviewed the history of Americangun laws extensively in Heller and Bruen. From theearliest days of the common law, firearm regulations have includedprovisions barring people from misusing weapons to harm or menaceothers. The act of “go[ing] armed to terrify the King’s subjects”was recognized at common law as a “great offence.” Sir JohnKnight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 118, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K. B.1686). Parliament began codifying prohibitions against such conductas early as the 1200s and 1300s, most notably in the Statute ofNorthampton of 1328. Bruen, 597 U.S., at 40. In theaftermath of the Reformation and the English Civil War, Parliamentpassed further restrictions. The Militia Act of 1662, for example,authorized the King’s agents to “seize all Armes in the custody orpossession of any person ... judge[d] dangerous to thePeace of the Kingdome.” 14 Car. 2 c. 3, §13 (1662); J. Greenlee,The Historical Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons FromPossessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 259 (2020).The Glorious Revolution cut back on the power ofthe Crown to disarm its subjects unilaterally. King James II had“caus[ed] several good Subjects being Protestants to be disarmed atthe same Time when Papists were ... armed.” 1 Wm. &Mary c. 2, §6, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 440 (1689). By way ofrebuke, Parliament adopted the English Bill of Rights, whichguaranteed “that the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Armsfor their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed byLaw.” §7, id., at 441. But as the document itselfmemorialized, the principle that arms-bearing was constrained “byLaw” remained. Ibid.Through these centuries, English law haddisarmed not only brigands and highwaymen but also politicalopponents and disfavored religious groups. By the time of thefounding, however, state constitutions and the Second Amendment hadlargely eliminated governmental authority to disarm politicalopponents on this side of the Atlantic. See Heller, 554U.S., at 594–595, 600–603. But regulations targetingindividuals who physically threatened others persisted. Suchconduct was often addressed through ordinary criminal laws andcivil actions, such as prohibitions on fighting or private suitsagainst individuals who threatened others. See 4 W. Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws of England 145–146, 149–150 (10th ed.1787) (Blackstone); 3 id., at 120. By the 1700s and early1800s, however, two distinct legal regimes had developed thatspecifically addressed firearms violence.The first were the surety laws. A form of“preventive justice,” these laws derived from the ancient practiceof frankpledges. 4 id., at 251–253. Reputedly dating to thetime of Canute, the frankpledge system involved compelling adultmen to organize themselves into ten-man “tithing[s].” A. Lefroy,Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law, Part II, 26 Yale L.J. 388,391 (1917). The members of each tithing then “mutually pledge[d]for each other’s good behaviour.” 4 Blackstone 252. Should any ofthe ten break the law, the remaining nine would be responsible forproducing him in court, or else face punishment in his stead. D.Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L.Rev. 345, 358(2003).Eventually, the communal frankpledge systemevolved into the individualized surety regime. Under the suretylaws, a magistrate could “oblig[e] those persons, [of] whom thereis a probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, tostipulate with and to give full assurance ... that suchoffence ... shall not happen[,] by finding pledges orsecurities.” 4 Blackstone 251. In other words, the law authorizedmagistrates to require individuals suspected of future misbehaviorto post a bond. Ibid. If an individual failed to post abond, he would be jailed. See, e.g., Mass. Rev.Stat., ch. 134, §6 (1836). If the individual did post a bond andthen broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit. 4 Blackstone253.Well entrenched in the common law, the suretylaws could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, includingspousal abuse. As Blackstone explained, “[w]ives [could] demand[sureties] against their husbands; or husbands, if necessary,against their wives.” Id., at 254. These often took the formof a surety of the peace, meaning that the defendant pledged to“keep the peace.” Id., at 252–253; see R. Bloch, TheAmerican Revolution, Wife Beating, and the Emergent Value ofPrivacy, 5 Early American Studies 223, 232–233, 234–235 (2007)(Bloch) (discussing peace bonds). Wives also demanded sureties forgood behavior, whereby a husband pledged to “demean and behavehimself well.” 4 Blackstone 253; see Bloch 232–233, 234–235, and n.34.While communities sometimes resorted to publicshaming or vigilante justice to chastise abusers, sureties providedthe public with a more measured solution. B. McConville, The Riseof Rough Music, in Riot and Revelry in Early America 90–100 (W.Pencak, M. Dennis, & S. Newman eds. 2002). In one widelyreported incident, Susannah Wyllys Strong, the wife of aConnecticut judge, appeared before Tapping Reeve in 1790 to make acomplaint against her husband. K. Ryan, “The Spirit ofContradiction”: Wife Abuse in New England, 1780–1820, 13 EarlyAmerican Studies 586, 602 (2015). Newspapers carried the story inConnecticut, Massachusetts, and New York. Ibid. Reeveultimately ordered the man to post a bond of £1,000. Id., at603.Importantly for this case, the surety laws alsotargeted the misuse of firearms. In 1795, for example,Massachusetts enacted a law authorizing justices of the peace to“arrest” all who “go armed offensively [and] require of theoffender to find sureties for his keeping the peace.” 1795 Mass.Acts ch. 2, in Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1794–1795, ch.26, pp. 66–67 (1896). Later, Massachusetts amended its surety lawsto be even more specific, authorizing the imposition of bonds fromindividuals “[who went] armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol,or other offensive and dangerous weapon.” Mass. Rev. Stat., ch.134, §16; see ibid. (marginal note) (referencing the earlierstatute). At least nine other jurisdictions did the same. SeeBruen, 597 U.S., at 56, and n.23.These laws often offered the accused significantprocedural protections. Before the accused could be compelled topost a bond for “go[ing] armed,” a complaint had to be made to ajudge or justice of the peace by “any person having reasonablecause to fear” that the accused would do him harm or breach thepeace. Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §§1, 16. The magistrate wouldtake evidence, and—if he determined that cause existed for thecharge—summon the accused, who could respond to the allegations.§§3–4. Bonds could not be required for more than six months at atime, and an individual could obtain an exception if he needed hisarms for self-defense or some other legitimate reason. §16.While the surety laws provided a mechanism forpreventing violence before it occurred, a second regime provided amechanism for punishing those who had menaced others with firearms.These were the “going armed” laws, a particular subset of theancient common-law prohibition on affrays.Derived from the French word “affraier,” meaning“to terrify,” 4 Blackstone 145, the affray laws traced their originto the Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328). Although theprototypical affray involved fighting in public, commentatorsunderstood affrays to encompass the offense of “arm[ing]” oneself“to the Terror of the People,” T. Barlow, The Justice of the Peace:A Treatise 11 (1745). Moreover, the prohibitions—on fighting andgoing armed—were often codified in the same statutes.E.g., 2 Edw. 3 c. 3; Acts and Laws of His Majesty’sProvince of New-Hampshire in New-England 2 (1761).Whether classified as an affray law or adistinct prohibition, the going armed laws prohibited “riding orgoing armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to]terrify[] the good people of the land.” 4 Blackstone 149(emphasis deleted). Such conduct disrupted the “public order” and“le[d] almost necessarily to actual violence.” State v.Huntly, 25 N.C. 418, 421–422 (1843)(percuriam). Therefore, the law punished these actswith “forfeiture of the arms ... and imprisonment.” 4Blackstone 149.In some instances, prohibitions on going armedand affrays were incorporated into American jurisprudence throughthe common law. See, e.g., Huntly, 25N.C., at 421–422; O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65,67 (1849); Hickman v. State, 193 Md. App. 238,253–255, 996 A.2d 974, 983 (2010) (recognizing that common-lawprohibition on fighting in public remains even now chargeable inMaryland). More- over, at least four States—Massachusetts, NewHampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia—expressly codifiedprohibitions on going armed. 1786 Va. Acts ch. 21; 2 Laws of theCommonwealth of Massachusetts from Nov. 28, 1780 to Feb. 28, 1807,pp. 652–653 (1807); Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province ofNew-Hampshire in New-England 2 (1761); Collection of All of thePublic Acts of Assembly, of the Province of North-Carolina: Now inForce and Use 131 (1751) (1741 statute).3Taken together, the surety and going armedlaws confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses aclear threat of physical violence to another, the threateningindividual may be disarmed. Section 922(g)(8) is by no meansidentical to these founding era regimes, but it does not need tobe. See Bruen, 597 U.S., at 30. Its prohibition on thepossession of firearms by those found by a court to present athreat to others fits neatly within the tradition the surety andgoing armed laws represent.Like the surety and going armed laws, Section922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found to threaten thephysical safety of another. This provision is “relevantly similar”to those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens theSecond Amendment right. Id., at 29. Section 922(g)(8)restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physicalviolence, just as the surety and going armed laws do. Unlike theregulation struck down in Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) does notbroadly restrict arms use by the public generally.The burden Section 922(g)(8) imposes on theright to bear arms also fits within our regulatory tradition. Whilewe do not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactmentof laws banning the possession of guns by categories of personsthought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse, seeHeller, 554 U.S., at 626, we note that Section922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that the defendant“represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of another.§922(g)(8)(C)(i). That matches the surety and going armed laws,which involved judicial determinations of whether a particulardefendant likely would threaten or had threatened another with aweapon.Moreover, like surety bonds of limited duration,Section 922(g)(8)’s restriction was temporary as applied to Rahimi.Section 922(g)(8) only prohibits firearm possession so long as thedefendant “is” subject to a restraining order. §922(g)(8). InRahimi’s case that is one to two years after his release fromprison, according to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §85.025(c) (West 2019).App. 6–7.Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect ofthe burden—also fits within the regulatory tradition. The goingarmed laws provided for imprisonment, 4 Blackstone 149, and ifimprisonment was permissible to respond to the use of guns tothreaten the physical safety of others, then the lesser restrictionof temporary disarmament that Section 922(g)(8) imposes is alsopermissible.Rahimi argues Heller requires us toaffirm, because Section 922(g)(8) bars individuals subject torestraining orders from possessing guns in the home, and inHeller we invalidated an “absolute prohibition of handguns... in the home.” 554 U.S., at 636; Brief forRespondent 32. But Heller never established a categoricalrule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbidfirearm possession in the home. In fact, our opinion stated thatmany such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by“felons and the mentally ill,” are “presumptively lawful.” 554U.S., at 626, 627, n.26.Our analysis of the surety laws in Bruenalso does not help Rahimi. In Bruen, we explained that thesurety laws were not a proper historical analogue for New York’sgun licensing regime. 597 U.S., at 55–60. What distinguishedthe regimes, we observed, was that the surety laws “presumed thatindividuals had a right to ... carry,” whereas NewYork’s law effectively presumed that no citizen had such a right,absent a special need. Id., at 56 (emphasis deleted).Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) does not make the same faulty presumption.To the contrary, it presumes, like the surety laws before it, thatthe Second Amendment right may only be burdened once a defendanthas been found to pose a credible threat to the physical safety ofothers. See ibid.While we also noted that the surety laws applieddifferent penalties than New York’s special-need regime, we did soonly to emphasize just how severely the State treated the rights ofits citizens. Id., at 57. But as we have explained, ourNation’s tradition of firearm regulation distinguishes citizens whohave been found to pose a credible threat to the physical safety ofothers from those who have not. The conclusion that focusedregulations like the surety laws are not a historical analogue fora broad prohibitory regime like New York’s does not mean that theycannot be an appropriate analogue for a narrow one.4In short, we have no trouble concluding thatSection 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s facial challenge. Our traditionof firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individualswho present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.Section 922(g)(8) can be applied lawfully to Rahimi.The dissent reaches a contrary conclusion,primarily on the ground that the historical analogues for Section922(g)(8) are not sufficiently similar to place that provision inour historical tradition. The dissent does, however, acknowledgethat Section 922(g)(8) is within that tradition when it comes tothe “why” of the appropriate inquiry. The objection is to the“how.” See post, at 18 (opinion of Thomas, J.). For thereasons we have set forth, however, we conclude that Section922(g)(8) satisfies that part of the inquiry as well. Seesupra, at 7, 13–15. As we said in Bruen, a“historical twin” is not required. 597 U.S., at30.For its part, the Fifth Circuit made two errors.First, like the dissent, it read Bruen to require a“historical twin” rather than a “historical analogue.” Ibid.(emphasis deleted). Second, it did not correctly apply ourprecedents governing facial challenges. 61 F.4th, at 453. Aswe have said in other contexts, “[w]hen legislation and theConstitution brush up against each other, [a court’s] task is toseek harmony, not to manufacture conflict.” United States v.Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 781 (2023). Rather than consider thecirc*mstances in which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to beconstitutional, the panel instead focused on hypothetical scenarioswhere Section 922(g)(8) might raise constitutional concerns. See 61F.4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho, J., concurring).That error left the panel slaying a straw man.[2]5Finally, in holding that Section 922(g)(8) isconstitutional as applied to Rahimi, we reject the Government’scontention that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not“responsible.” Brief for United States 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg.8–11. “Responsible” is a vague term. It is unclear what such a rulewould entail. Nor does such a line derive from our case law. InHeller and Bruen, we used the term “responsible” todescribe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy theSecond Amendment right. See, e.g., Heller, 554U.S., at 635; Bruen, 597 U.S., at 70. But thosedecisions did not define the term and said nothing about the statusof citizens who were not “responsible.” The question was simply notpresented.*  *  *In Heller, McDonald, andBruen, this Court did not “undertake an exhaustivehistorical analysis ... of the full scope of the SecondAmendment.” Bruen, 597 U.S., at 31. Nor do we do sotoday. Rather, we conclude only this: An individual found by acourt to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of anothermay be temporarily disarmed consistent with the SecondAmendment.The judgment of the Court of Appeals for theFifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–915_________________UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEYRAHIMIon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the fifth circuit[June 21, 2024]Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kaganjoins, concurring.Today, the Court applies its decision in NewYork State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597U.S. 1 (2022), for the first time. Although I continue to believethat Bruen was wrongly decided, see id., at 83–133(Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting), Ijoin the Court’s opinion applying that precedent to uphold 18U.S.C. §922(g)(8).The Court today emphasizes that a challengedregulation “must comport with the principles underlying the SecondAmendment,” but need not have a precise historical match.Ante, at 7–8. I agree. I write separately to highlight whythe Court’s interpretation of Bruen, and not the dissent’s,is the right one. In short, the Court’s interpretation permits ahistorical inquiry calibrated to reveal something useful andtransferable to the present day, while the dissent would make thehistorical inquiry so exacting as to be useless, a too-sensitivealarm that sounds whenever a regulation did not exist in anessentially identical form at the founding.IEven under Bruen, this is an easy case.Section 922(g)(8) prohibits an individual subject to a domesticviolence restraining order from possessing a firearm, so long ascertain criteria are met. See ante, at 3–4. Section922(g)(8) is wholly consistent with the Nation’s history andtradition of firearm regulation.The Court correctly concludes that “the SecondAmendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose acredible threat to the physical safety of others.” Ante, at8. That conclusion finds historical support in both the suretylaws, which “provided a mechanism for preventing violence before itoccurred” by requiring an individual who posed a credible threat ofviolence to another to post a surety, and the “going armed” laws,which “provided a mechanism for punishing those who had menacedothers with firearms” through forfeiture of the arms orimprisonment. Ante, at 12. “Taken together, the surety andgoing armed laws confirm what common sense suggests: When anindividual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another,the threatening individual may be disarmed.” Ante, at 13.Section 922(g)(8)’s prohibition on gun possession for individualssubject to domestic violence restraining orders is part of that“tradition of firearm regulation allow[ing] the Government todisarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physicalsafety of others,” ante, at 16, as are the similarrestrictions that have been adopted by 48 States and Territories,see Brief for United States 34–35, and nn. 22–23 (collectingstatutes).The Court’s opinion also clarifies an importantmethodological point that bears repeating: Rather than askingwhether a present-day gun regulation has a precise historicalanalogue, courts applying Bruen should “conside[r] whetherthe challenged regulation is consistent with the principlesthat underpin our regulatory tradition.” Ante, at 7(emphasis added); see also ante, at 7–8 (“The law mustcomport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but itneed not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin’” (quotingBruen, 597 U.S., at 30)). Here, for example, theGovernment has not identified a founding-era or Reconstruction-eralaw that specifically disarmed domestic abusers, see,e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 40 (conceding as much), but itdid not need to do so. Although §922(g)(8) “is by no meansidentical” to the surety or going armed laws, ante, at 13,it “restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physicalviolence, just as the surety and going armed laws d[id],”ante, at 14. That shared principle is sufficient.IIThe dissent reaches a different conclusion byapplying the strictest possible interpretation of Bruen. Itpicks off the Government’s historical sources one by one, viewingany basis for distinction as fatal. See, e.g.,post, at 18 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“Although surety lawsshared a common justification with §922(g)(8), surety laws imposeda materially different burden”); post, at 25–26 (explainingthat “[a]ffray laws are wide of the mark” because they “expresslycarve out the very conduct §922(g)(8) was designed to prevent(interpersonal violence in the home)”). The dissent urges a closelook “at the historical law’s justification as articulated duringthe relevant time period,” post, at 28, and a “carefulparsing of regulatory burdens” to ensure that courts do not “straytoo far from [history] by eliding material differences betweenhistorical and modern laws,” post, at 15. The dissentcriticizes this Court for adopting a more “piecemeal approach” thatdistills principles from a variety of historical evidence ratherthan insisting on a precise historical analogue. Post, at21.If the dissent’s interpretation of Bruenwere the law, then Bruen really would be the “one-wayratchet” that I and the other dissenters in that case feared,“disqualify[ing] virtually any ‘representative historical analogue’and mak[ing] it nearly impossible to sustain common-senseregulations necessary to our Nation’s safety and security.” 597U.S., at 112 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thankfully, the Courtrejects that rigid approach to the historical inquiry. As the Courtputs it today, Bruen was “not meant to suggest a law trappedin amber.” Ante, at 7.This case lays bare the perils of the dissent’sapproach. Because the dissent concludes that “§922(g)(8) addressesa societal problem—the risk of interpersonal violence—‘that haspersisted since the 18th century,’” it insists that the meansof addressing that problem cannot be “‘materiallydifferent’” from the means that existed in the 18th century.Post, at 7. That is so, it seems, even when the weapons inquestion have evolved dramatically. See R. Roth, Why Guns Are andAre Not the Problem, in A Right To Bear Arms?: The Contested Roleof History in Contemporary Debates on the Second Amendment 117 (J.Tucker, B. Hacker, & M. Vining eds. 2019) (explaining that gunsin the 18th century took a long time to load, typically fired onlyone shot, and often misfired). According to the dissent, thesolution cannot be “materially different” even when societalperception of the problem has changed, and even if it is now clearto everyone that the historical means of addressing the problem hadbeen wholly inadequate. Given the fact that the law at the foundingwas more likely to protect husbands who abused their spouses thanoffer some measure of accountability, see, e.g., R.Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative andPrivacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2154–2170 (1996), it is nosurprise that that generation did not have an equivalent to§922(g)(8). Under the dissent’s approach, the legislatures of todaywould be limited not by a distant generation’s determination thatsuch a law was unconstitutional, but by a distant generation’sfailure to consider that such a law might be necessary. History hasa role to play in Second Amendment analysis, but a rigid adherenceto history, (particularly history predating the inclusion of womenand people of color as full members of the polity), impoverishesconstitutional interpretation and hamstrings our democracy.IIIThe Court today clarifies Bruen’shistorical inquiry and rejects the dissent’s exacting historicaltest. I welcome that development. That being said, I remaintroubled by Bruen’s myopic focus on history and tradition,which fails to give full consideration to the real and presentstakes of the problems facing our society today. In my view, theSecond Amendment allows legislators “to take account of the seriousproblems posed by gun violence,” Bruen, 597 U.S., at91 (Breyer, J., dissenting), not merely by asking what theirpredecessors at the time of the founding or Reconstruction thought,but by listening to their constituents and crafting new andappropriately tailored solutions. Under the means-end scrutiny thatthis Court rejected in Bruen but “regularly use[s]... in cases involving other constitutionalprovisions,” id., at 106, the constitutionality of§922(g)(8) is even more readily apparent.[1]*To start, the Government has a compellinginterest in keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers.A woman who lives in a house with a domestic abuser is five timesmore likely to be murdered if the abuser has access to a gun. SeeA. Kivisto & M. Porter, Firearm Use Increases Risk of MultipleVictims in Domestic Homicides, 48 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L.26 (2020). With over 70 people shot and killed by an intimatepartner each month in the United States, the seriousness of theproblem can hardly be overstated. See Centers for Disease Controland Prevention, WISQARS Nat. Violent Death Reporting System,Violent Deaths Report 2020, https://wisqars.cdc.gov/nvdrs (showingthat 863 people were killed with a firearm by a spouse or otherintimate partner in 2020). Because domestic violence is rarelyconfined to the intimate partner that receives the protectiveorder, the Government’s interest extends even further. In roughly aquarter of cases where an abuser killed an intimate partner, theabuser also killed someone else, such as a child, family member, orroommate. See S. Smith, K. Fowler, & P. Niolon, IntimatePartner Homicide and Corollary Victims in 16 States: NationalViolent Death Reporting System, 2003–2009, 104 Am. J. Pub. Health461, 463–464 (2014). Moreover, one study found that domesticdisputes were the most dangerous type of call for respondingofficers, causing more officer deaths with a firearm than any othertype of call. See N. Breul & M. Keith, Deadly Calls and FatalEncounters: Analysis of U.S. Law Enforcement Line of DutyDeaths When Officers Responded to Dispatched Calls for Service andConducted Enforcement, 2010–2014, p. 15 (2016).While the Second Amendment does not yieldautomatically to the Government’s compelling interest, §922(g)(8)is tailored to the vital objective of keeping guns out of the handsof domestic abusers. See ante, at 3–4, 14. Section 922(g)(8)should easily pass constitutional muster under any level ofscrutiny.Although I continue to think that the means-endapproach to Second Amendment analysis is the right one, neitherparty asks the Court to reconsider Bruen at this time, andthat question would of course involve other considerations thanwhether Bruen was rightly decided. Whether considered underBruen or under means-end scrutiny, §922(g)(8) clears theconstitutional bar. I join in full the Court’s opinion, whichoffers a more helpful model than the dissent for lower courtsstruggling to apply Bruen.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–915_________________UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEY RAHIMIon writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals forthe fifth circuit[June 21, 2024]Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.The Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights wisely soughtthe best of both worlds: democratic self-government and theprotection of individual rights against excesses of that form ofgovernment. In justiciable cases, this Court determines whether ademocratically enacted law or other government action infringes onindividual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. When performingthat Article III duty, the Court does not implement its own policyjudgments about, for example, free speech or gun regulation.Rather, the Court interprets and applies the Constitution byexamining text, pre-ratification and post-ratification history, andprecedent. The Court’s opinion today does just that, and I join itin full.The concurring opinions, and the briefs of the parties andamici in this case, raise important questions about judicialreliance on text, history, and precedent, particularly in SecondAmendment cases. I add this concurring opinion to review the properroles of text, history, and precedent in constitutionalinterpretation.IThe American people established an enduring AmericanConstitution. The first and most important rule in constitutionalinterpretation is to heed the text—that is, the actual words of theConstitution—and to interpret that text according to its ordinarymeaning as originally understood. The text of the Constitution isthe “Law of the Land.” Art. VI. As a general matter, the text ofthe Constitution says what it means and means what it says. Andunless and until it is amended, that text controls.In many important provisions, the Constitution is a document ofmajestic specificity with “strikingly clean prose.” A. Amar,America’s Constitution xi (2005). Two Houses of Congress. A Houseelected every two years. Senators serve 6-year terms. Two Senatorsper State. A State’s equal suffrage in the Senate may not bechanged without the State’s consent. A two-thirds House vote toexpel a Member of the House. The same for the Senate.Appropriations are made by law. Bicameralism and presentment. ThePresidential veto. The Presidential pardon. The President serves a4-year term. A maximum of two elected terms for a President. Thesalary of a sitting President may not be increased or decreased. Avote of a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate toremove a President. The President nominates and the Senate confirmsprincipal executive officers. One Supreme Court. Tenure and salaryprotection for Supreme Court and other federal judges. Two-thirdsof each House of Congress together with three-fourths of the Statesmay amend the Constitution. Congress meets at noon on January 3rdunless otherwise specified by Congress. The District of Columbiavotes in Presidential elections. The list goes on.Those and many other constitutional provisions are relativelyclear. And when the “framers of the Constitution employed words intheir natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort tocollateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot beindulged in to narrow or enlarge the text.” McPherson v.Blacker, 146 U.S.1, 27 (1892).Of course, some provisions of the Constitution are broadlyworded or vague—to put it in Madison’s words, “more or less obscureand equivocal.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 229 (C. Rossiter ed.1961). As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, the Constitution is insome parts “obviously not a specifically worded document but onecouched in general phraseology.” W. Rehnquist, The Notion of aLiving Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693, 697 (1976).That is especially true with respect to the broadly worded orvague individual-rights provisions. (I will use the terms “broadlyworded” and “vague” interchangeably in this opinion.) For example,the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law”“abridging the freedom of speech.” And the Second Amendment, atissue here, guarantees that “the right of the people to keep andbear Arms” “shall not be infringed.”Read literally, those Amendments might seem to grantabsolute protection, meaning that the government could neverregulate speech or guns in any way. But American law has longrecognized, as a matter of original understanding and originalmeaning, that constitutional rights generally come withexceptions.With respect to the First Amendment, for example, this Court’s“jurisprudence over the past 216”—now 233—“years has rejected anabsolutist interpretation.” Federal Election Comm’n v.Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.449, 482 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see R. Bork,Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.L.J. 1, 21–22 (1971). From 1791 to the present, “the FirstAmendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech ina few limited areas”—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, andincitement. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.460, 468 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). So too with respectto the Second Amendment: “Like most rights, the right secured bythe Second Amendment is not unlimited”; it is “not a right to keepand carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and forwhatever purpose.” District of Columbia v. Heller,554U.S. 570, 626 (2008).IIA recurring and difficult issue for judges, therefore, is how tointerpret vague constitutional text. That issue often arises (ashere) in the context of determining exceptions to textuallyguaranteed individual rights. To what extent does the Constitutionallow the government to regulate speech or guns, forexample?[1]In many cases, judicial precedent informs or controls the answer(more on that later). But absent precedent, there are really onlytwo potential answers to the question of how to determineexceptions to broadly worded constitutional rights: history orpolicy.Generally speaking, the historical approach examines the laws,practices, and understandings from before and after ratificationthat may help the interpreter discern the meaning of theconstitutional text and the principles embodied in that text. Thepolicy approach rests on the philosophical or policy dispositionsof the individual judge.History, not policy, is the proper guide.For more than 200 years, this Court has relied on history whenconstruing vague constitutional text in all manner ofconstitutional disputes. For good reason. History can supplyevidence of the original meaning of vague text. History is far lesssubjective than policy. And reliance on history is more consistentwith the properly neutral judicial role than an approach wherejudges subtly (or not so subtly) impose their own policy views onthe American people.Judges are like umpires, as The Chief Justice has aptlyexplained. And in a constitutional system that counts on anindependent Judiciary, judges must act like umpires. To be anumpire, the judge “must stick close to the text and the history,and their fair implications,” because there “is no principled way”for a neutral judge “to prefer any claimed human value to anyother.” R. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First AmendmentProblems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 8 (1971). History establishes a“criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferencesof the judge himself.” A. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 864 (1989). When properly applied, historyhelps ensure that judges do not simply create constitutionalmeaning “out of whole cloth.” A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Lawof Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989).[2]Absent precedent, therefore, history guides the interpretationof vague constitutional text. Of course, this Court has beendeciding constitutional cases for about 230 years, so relevantprecedent often exists. As the Court’s opinions over time amplydemonstrate, precedent matters a great deal in constitutionalinterpretation.I now turn to explaining how courts apply pre-ratificationhistory, post-ratification history, and precedent when analyzingvague constitutional text.APre-ratification history. When interpreting vagueconstitutional text, the Court typically scrutinizes the statedintentions and understandings of the Framers and Ratifiers of theConstitution (or, as relevant, the Amendments). The Court alsolooks to the understandings of the American people from thepertinent ratification era. Those intentions and understandings donot necessarily determine meaning, but they may be strong evidenceof meaning. See generally, e.g., The Federalist (C. Rossitered. 1961); Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Farranded. 1911); Debates on the Federal Constitution (J. Elliot ed.1836).Especially for the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights,the Court also examines the pre-ratification history in theAmerican Colonies, including pre-ratification laws and practices.And the Court pays particular attention to the historical laws andpractices in the United States from Independence in 1776 untilratification in 1788 or 1791. Pre-ratification American history canshed light on constitutional meaning in various ways.For example, some provisions of the Constitution use languagethat appeared in the Articles of Confederation or stateconstitutional provisions. And when the language that appeared inthe Articles of Confederation or in state constitutions is the sameas or similar to the language in the U.S. Constitution, thehistory of how people understood the language in the Articles orstate constitutions can inform interpretation of that language inthe U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Moorev. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 33 (2023) (the “Framers did not writethe Elections Clause on a blank slate—they instead borrowed fromthe Articles of Confederation” as evidenced by their use of“closely parallel” language); District of Columbia v.Heller, 554 U.S.570, 600–601 (2008) (“Our interpretation is confirmed byanalogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that precededand immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment”);United States Steel Corp. v.Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S.452, 460, and n. 10 (1978) (“The history of interstateagreements under the Articles of Confederation suggests the samedistinction between ‘treaties, alliances, and confederations’ onthe one hand, and ‘agreements and compacts’ on the other,” as thedistinction made in the Constitution’s Treaty and CompactClauses).Similarly, other pre-ratification national or state laws andpractices may sometimes help an interpreter discern the meaning ofparticular constitutional provisions. Those pre-ratificationAmerican laws and practices formed part of the foundation on whichthe Framers constructed the Constitution and Bill of Rights.Indeed, the Constitution did not displace but largely co-existswith state constitutions and state laws, except to the extent theyconflict with federal law. See Art. VI.On the other hand, some pre-ratification history can beprobative of what the Constitution does not mean. TheFramers drafted and approved many provisions of the Constitutionprecisely to depart from rather than adhere to certainpre-ratification laws, practices, or understandings.For example, the “defects” of the Articles of Confederationinspired some of the key decisions made by the Framers inPhiladelphia and by the First Congress in drafting the Bill ofRights. The Federalist No. 37, at 224 (J. Madison); see,e.g., id., at 226 (“the existing Confederationis founded on principles which are fallacious; that we mustconsequently change this first foundation, and with it thesuperstructure resting upon it”); PennEast Pipeline Co.v.New Jersey, 594 U.S. 482, 508 (2021) (“When theFramers met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, they sought tocreate a cohesive national sovereign in response to the failings ofthe Articles of Confederation”); Sosa v.Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 716–717 (2004) (“The Continental Congress was hamstrung byits inability to ‘cause infractions of treaties, or of the law ofnations to be punished,’” and the “Framers responded byvesting the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over ‘allCases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls,’and the First Congress followed through” (citation omitted));U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.779, 803 (1995) (“After the Constitutional Convention convened,the Framers were presented with, and eventually adopted a variationof, a plan not merely to amend the Articles of Confederation but tocreate an entirely new National Government with a NationalExecutive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature”(quotation marks omitted)).The pre-ratification history of America’s many objections toBritish laws and the system of oppressive British rule over theColonies—identified most prominently in the Declaration ofIndependence—can likewise inform interpretation of some of thecrucial provisions of the original Constitution and Bill of Rights.Compare Declaration of Independence ¶11 (under British rule, theKing “made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure oftheir offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries”) withU.S. Const., Art.III, §1 (“The Judges, both of thesupreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during goodBehaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during theirContinuance in Office”); see, e.g., The FederalistNo. 37, at 226 (“The most that the convention could do” “was toavoid the errors suggested by the past experience of othercountries, as well as of our own”); 1 Annals of Cong. 436 (1789)(J. Madison) (“The freedom of the press and rights of conscience,those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in theBritish Constitution”).This Court has recognized, for example, that no “purpose inratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing forthe people of the United States much greater freedom of religion,expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britainhad ever enjoyed.” Bridges v.California,314 U.S.252, 265 (1941). Ratified as it was “while the memory of manyoppressive English restrictions on the enumerated liberties wasstill fresh,” the Bill of Rights “cannot reasonably be taken asapproving prevalent English practices.” Ibid.; see,e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Churchand School v. EEOC, 565 U.S.171, 183 (2012) (“Familiar with life under the establishedChurch of England, the founding generation sought to foreclose thepossibility of a national church” through the First Amendment’sEstablishment Clause); Powell v.Alabama,287 U.S.45, 60 (1932) (right to counsel under the Sixth Amendmentreflected America’s rejection of the English common law rule that a“person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid ofcounsel”).[3]The Equal Protection Clause provides another example. Ratifiedin 1868, that Clause sought to reject the Nation’s history ofracial discrimination, not to backdoor incorporate raciallydiscriminatory and oppressive historical practices and laws intothe Constitution. See generally Flowers v.Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019); Batson v.Kentucky, 476 U.S.79 (1986); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.483 (1954).In short, pre-ratification American history—that is,pre-ratification laws, practices, and understandings—can informinterpretation of vague constitutional provisions in the originalConstitution and Bill of Rights. The same principle of looking torelevant pre-ratification history applies when interpreting broadlyworded language in the later amendments, including the FourteenthAmendment ratified in 1868. But in using pre-ratification history,courts must exercise care to rely only on the history that theConstitution actually incorporated and not on the history that theConstitution left behind.BPost-ratification history. As the Framers made clear, andas this Court has stated time and again for more than twocenturies, post-ratification history—sometimes referred to astradition—can also be important for interpreting vagueconstitutional text and determining exceptions to individualconstitutional rights. When the text is vague and thepre-ratification history is elusive or inconclusive,post-ratification history becomes especially important. Indeed,absent precedent, there can be little else to guide a judgedeciding a constitutional case in that situation, unless the judgesimply defaults to his or her own policy preferences.After ratification, the National Government and the stategovernments began interpreting and applying the Constitution’stext. They have continued to do so ever since. As the national andstate governments over time have enacted laws and implementedpractices to promote the general welfare, those laws and practiceshave often reflected and reinforced common understandings of theConstitution’s authorizations and limitations.Post-ratification interpretations and applications by governmentactors—at least when reasonably consistent and longstanding—can beprobative of the meaning of vague constitutional text. Thecollective understanding of Americans who, over time, haveinterpreted and applied the broadly worded constitutional text canprovide good guidance for a judge who is trying to interpret thatsame text decades or centuries later. See, e.g.,Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.765, 785 (2002) (a “universal and long-established tradition ofprohibiting certain conduct creates a strong presumption that theprohibition is constitutional” (quotation marks omitted));United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.459, 472–473 (1915) (“officers, law-makers and citizensnaturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action” of thegovernment “on the presumption that” unconstitutional “acts wouldnot have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallizeinto a regular practice”); McPherson v. Blacker,146 U.S.1, 27 (1892) (when constitutional text is vague,“contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction are entitledto the greatest weight”).[4]Importantly, the Framers themselves intended thatpost-ratification history would shed light on the meaning of vagueconstitutional text. They understood that some constitutional textmay be “more or less obscure and equivocal” such that questions“daily occur in the course of practice.” The Federalist No. 37, at228–229. Madison explained that the meaning of vague text would be“liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussionsand adjudications.” Id., at 229. In other words, Madisonarticulated the Framers’ expectation and intent thatpost-ratification history would be a proper and important tool tohelp constitutional interpreters determine the meaning of vagueconstitutional text.From early on, this Court followed Madison’s lead. In 1819, inone of its most important decisions ever, the Court addressed thescope of Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause. McCullochv. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). Writing for the Court,Chief Justice Marshall invoked post-ratification history toconclude that Congress’s authority to establish a national bankcould “scarcely be considered as an open question.” Id., at401. The constitutionality of the national bank had “beenrecognised by many successive legislatures,” and an “exposition ofthe constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, onthe faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought notto be lightly disregarded.” Ibid. Marshall added: The“respective powers of those who are equally the representatives ofthe people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practiceof the government, ought to receive a considerable impression fromthat practice.” Ibid.In relying on post-ratification history as a proper tool todiscern constitutional meaning, Madison and Marshall make for aformidable duo. Moving from distant American history to more recenttimes, one can add Justice Scalia. Throughout his consequential30-year tenure on this Court, Justice Scalia repeatedly emphasizedthat constitutional interpretation must take account of text,pre-ratification history, and post-ratification history—the last ofwhich he often referred to as “tradition.” In his words, whenjudges interpret vague or broadly worded constitutional text, the“traditions of our people” are “paramount.” McDonald v.Chicago, 561 U.S.742, 792 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). Constitutionalinterpretation should reflect “the principles adhered to, overtime, by the American people, rather than those favored by thepersonal (and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of amajority of this Court.” Rutan v. Republican Party ofIll., 497 U.S.62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).The U.S. Reports are well stocked with Scalia opinionslooking to post-ratification history and tradition.[5] In Heller, Justice Scalia wrote forthe Court that “a critical tool of constitutional interpretation”is “the examination of a variety of legal and other sources todetermine the public understanding of a legal text in theperiod after its enactment or ratification.” 554 U.S., at 605(emphasis in original); see also ibid. (“We now address howthe Second Amendment was interpreted from immediately after itsratification through the end of the 19th century”).Heller echoed years of earlier Scalia opinions. To takeone: “Where the meaning of a constitutional text (such as ‘thefreedom of speech’) is unclear, the widespread and long-acceptedpractices of the American people are the best indication of whatfundamental beliefs it was intended to enshrine.” McIntyrev. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514U.S. 334, 378 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Or another: A“venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on theexamining table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstractprinciple” of “adjudication devised by this Court. To the contrary,such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court’sprinciples are to be formed. They are, in these uncertain areas,the very points of reference by which the legitimacy orillegitimacy of other practices is to be figured out.”Rutan, 497 U.S., at 95–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).As leading actors and theorists in the earliest and latestchapters of the American constitutional story, Madison, Marshall,and Scalia made clear that courts should look to post-ratificationhistory as well as pre-ratification history to interpret vagueconstitutional text.For more than two centuries—from the early 1800s to thiscase—this Court has done just that. The Court has repeatedlyemployed post-ratification history to determine the meaning ofvague constitutional text. Reliance on post-ratification history“has shaped scores of Court cases spanning all domains ofconstitutional law, every era of the nation’s history, and Justicesof every stripe.” S. Girgis, Living Traditionalism, 98 N. Y. U. L.Rev. 1477, 1480 (2023); see, e.g., Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. ofAmerica, Ltd., 601 U.S. 416, 441–445 (2024) (Kagan, J.,concurring); Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, 113–115(2024) (percuriam); Moore v. Harper, 600U.S. 1, 22, 32–34 (2023); Kennedy v. BremertonSchool Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 535–536, 540–541, and n. 6(2022); New York State Rifle Pistol Assn., Inc. v.Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 35–37, 50–70 (2022); City ofAustin v. Reagan Nat. Advertising of Austin, LLC, 596U.S. 61, 75 (2022); Houston Community College System v.Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474–477 (2022); PennEast PipelineCo. v. New Jersey, 594 U.S. 482, 494–497, 508 (2021);TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424–425,432–434 (2021); Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 314(2021); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848,858–862 (2020); Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578,592–597 (2020); American Legion v. American HumanistAssn., 588 U.S. 29, 58–66 (2019); Zivotofsky v.Kerry, 576 U.S.1, 15–17, 23–28 (2015); Town of Greece v.Galloway, 572 U.S.565, 575–579 (2014); District of Columbia v.Heller, 554 U.S.570, 605–619, 626–628 (2008); Crawford v.Washington, 541 U.S.36, 47–50 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S.466, 481–483, and n. 10 (2000); Medina v.California, 505 U.S.437, 445–448 (1992); Holland v. Illinois,493 U.S.474, 481–482, and n. 1 (1990); Marsh v. Chambers,463 U.S.783, 786–792 (1983); Dames Moore v. Regan,453 U.S.654, 678–682 (1981); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City ofNew York, 397 U.S.664, 676–680 (1970); Powell v. McCormack,395U.S. 486, 522, 541–547 (1969); Youngstown Sheet Tube Co.v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.579, 610–613 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); UnitedStates v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.304, 321–329 (1936); The Pocket Veto Case,279 U.S.655, 688–691 (1929); Myers v. United States,272 U.S.52, 155–158 (1926); United States v. Midwest OilCo., 236 U.S.459, 469–475 (1915); Marshall Field Co. v. Clark,143 U.S.649, 683–692 (1892); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken LandImprovement Co., 18 How. 272, 279–280 (1856); McCullochv. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 400–401 (1819).[6]CPrecedent. With a Constitution and a Supreme Court thatare both more than two centuries old, this Court and other courtsare rarely interpreting a constitutional provision for the firsttime. Rather, a substantial body of Supreme Court precedent alreadyexists for many provisions of the Constitution.Precedent is fundamental to day-to-day constitutionaldecisionmaking in this Court and every American court. The“judicial Power” established in Article III incorporates theprinciple of stare decisis, both vertical and horizontal. AsHamilton stated, to “avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rulesand precedents” that will “unavoidably swell to a very considerablebulk” and “serve to define and point out their duty in everyparticular case that comes before them.” The Federalist No. 78, at471 (A. Hamilton).Courts must respect precedent, while at the same timerecognizing that precedent on occasion may appropriately beoverturned. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S.483; West Coast Hotel Co. v.Parrish,300 U.S.379 (1937); see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.83, 115–132 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). In light ofthe significant amount of Supreme Court precedent that has built upover time, this Court and other courts often decide constitutionalcases by reference to those extensive bodies of precedent.Even then, however, text and history still matter a great deal.When determining how broadly or narrowly to read a precedent; whendetermining whether to extend, limit, or narrow a precedent; or inrelatively infrequent cases, when determining whether to overrule aprecedent, a court often will consider how the precedent squareswith the Constitution’s text and history. Therefore, the text, aswell as pre-ratification and post-ratification history, mayappropriately function as a gravitational pull on the Court’sinterpretation of precedent. See Free Enterprise Fundv.Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d667, 698 (CADC 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“We shouldresolve questions about the scope of those precedents in light ofand in the direction of the constitutional text and constitutionalhistory”).But the first stop in this Court’s constitutional decisionmakingis the Court’s precedents—the accumulated wisdom of jurists fromMarshall and Story to Harlan and Taft; from Hughes and Black toJackson and White; from Rehnquist and O’Connor to Kennedy andScalia; and so on.IIISome say that courts should determine exceptions to broadlyworded individual rights, including the Second Amendment, bylooking to policy. Uphold a law if it is a good idea; strike itdown if it is not. True, the proponents of a policy-based approachto interpretation of broadly worded or vague constitutional textusually do not say so explicitly (although some do). Rather, theysupport a balancing approach variously known as means-end scrutiny,heightened scrutiny, tiers of scrutiny, rational basis with bite,or strict or intermediate or intermediate-plus or rigorous orskeptical scrutiny. Whatever the label of the day, that balancingapproach is policy by another name. It requires judges to weigh thebenefits against the burdens of a law and to uphold the law asconstitutional if, in the judge’s view, the law is sufficientlyreasonable or important. See M. Barnes E. Chemerinsky, The Once andFuture Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 Conn. L.Rev. 1059, 1080(2011) (“The levels of scrutiny are essentially balancingtests”).To begin, as I have explained, that kind of balancing approachto constitutional interpretation departs from what Framers such asMadison stated, what jurists such as Marshall and Scalia did, whatjudges as umpires should strive to do, and what this Court hasactually done across the constitutional landscape for the last twocenturies.The balancing tests (heightened scrutiny and the like) are arelatively modern judicial innovation in constitutionaldecisionmaking. The “tiers of scrutiny have no basis in the text ororiginal meaning of the Constitution.” J. Alicea J. Ohlendorf,Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, National Affairs 72,73 (2019). And before the late 1950s, “what we would now callstrict judicial scrutiny did not exist.” R. Fallon, The Nature ofConstitutional Rights: The Invention and Logic of Strict JudicialScrutiny 30 (2019).The Court “appears to have adopted” heightened-scrutiny tests“by accident” in the 1950s and 1960s in a series of Communistspeech cases, “rather than as the result of a considered judgment.”Simon Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State CrimeVictims Bd., 502 U.S.105, 125 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). TheCourt has employed balancing only in discrete areas ofconstitutional law—and even in those cases, history still tends toplay a far larger role than overt judicial policymaking.[7]To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Court overrule caseswhere the Court has applied those heightened-scrutiny tests. But Iam challenging the notion that those tests are the ordinaryapproach to constitutional interpretation. And I am arguing againstextending those tests to new areas, including the SecondAmendment.One major problem with using a balancing approach to determineexceptions to constitutional rights is that it requires highlysubjective judicial evaluations of how important a law is—at leastunless the balancing test itself incorporates history, in whichcase judges might as well just continue to rely on historydirectly.The subjective balancing approach forces judges to act more likelegislators who decide what the law should be, rather than judgeswho “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is because the balancing approachrequires judges to weigh the benefits of a law against itsburdens—a value-laden and political task that is usually reservedfor the political branches. And that power in essence vests judgeswith “a roving commission to second-guess” legislators andadministrative officers “concerning what is best for the country.”W. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev.693, 698 (1976). Stated otherwise, when a court “does not have asolid textual anchor or an established social norm from which toderive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortablylike legislation.” A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989).Moreover, the balancing approach is ill-defined. Some judgeswill apply heightened scrutiny with a presumption in favor ofdeference to the legislature. Other judges will apply heightenedscrutiny with a presumption in favor of the individual right inquestion. Because it is unmoored, the balancing approach presentsthe real “danger” that “judges will mistake their own predilectionsfor the law.” A. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin.L. Rev. 849, 863 (1989). Under the balancing approach, to useJustice Scalia’s characteristically vivid description, if “We TheCourt conclude that They The People’s answers to a problem” areunwise, “we are free to intervene,” but if we “think the States maybe on to something, we can loosen the leash.” McDonald v.Chicago, 561 U.S.742, 803 (2010) (concurring opinion) (quotation marksomitted).The balancing approach can be antithetical to the principle thatjudges must act like umpires. It turns judges into players. JusticeBlack once protested that the Court should not balance away bedrockfree speech protections for the perceived policy needs of themoment. He argued that “the balancing approach” “disregards all ofthe unique features of our Constitution” by giving “the Court,along with Congress, a greater power, that of overriding the plaincommands of the Bill of Rights on a finding of weighty publicinterest.” H. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 865,878–879 (1960). Like Justice Black, the Court in Hellercautioned that a “constitutional guarantee subject to futurejudges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutionalguarantee at all.” 554 U.S.570, 634 (2008).Some respond that history can be difficult to decipher. It istrue that using history to interpret vague text can require“nuanced judgments,” McDonald, 561 U.S., at 803–804(Scalia, J., concurring), and is “sometimes inconclusive,” Scalia,Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L.Rev., at 864. Butat a minimum, history tends to narrow the range of possiblemeanings that may be ascribed to vague constitutional language. Ahistory-based methodology supplies direction and imposes a neutraland democratically infused constraint on judicialdecisionmaking.The historical approach is not perfect. But “the question to bedecided is not whether the historically focused method is aperfect means of restraining aristocratic judicialConstitution-writing; but whether it is the best meansavailable in an imperfect world.” McDonald, 561U.S., at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).And the historical approach is superior to judicial policymaking.The historical approach “depends upon a body of evidencesusceptible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vagueethico-political First Principles whose combined conclusion can befound to point in any direction the judges favor.” Ibid.Moreover, the historical approach “intrudes less upon thedemocratic process because the rights it acknowledges are thoseestablished by a constitutional history formed by democraticdecisions; and the rights it fails to acknowledge are left to bedemocratically adopted or rejected by the people.” Id., at805.IVThis Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence has carefullyfollowed and reinforced the Court’s longstanding approach toconstitutional interpretation—relying on text, pre-ratification andpost-ratification history, and precedent.In Heller, the Court began with the baseline point thatthe Second Amendment textually guarantees an individual right. TheCourt then explained that the Second Amendment right is, of course,“not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any mannerwhatsoever and for whatever purpose” and is subject to “important”limitations. 554U.S. 570, 626–627 (2008).Although Heller declined to “undertake an exhaustivehistorical analysis,” it recognized a few categories of traditionalexceptions to the right. Id., at 626. For example,Heller indicated that: (i) “prohibitions on carryingconcealed weapons were lawful”; (ii) the Second Amendment attachesonly to weapons “in common use” because “that limitation is fairlysupported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carryingof dangerous and unusual weapons”; and (iii) “longstandingprohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and thementally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms insensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or lawsimposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale ofarms” are presumptively constitutional. Id., at 626–627(quotation marks omitted).In McDonald, the Court held that the Second Amendment wasincorporated against the States. In so holding, the Courtreiterated the presumed constitutionality of the “longstandingregulatory measures” identified in Heller. 561 U.S.742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).Then, in Bruen, the Court repeated that the “Nation’shistorical tradition of firearm regulation” guides theconstitutional analysis of gun regulations and exceptions to theright to bear arms. 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022); see id., at 79–81(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).This Court’s approach in those three recent Second Amendmentcases—and in the Court’s opinion today—is entirely consistent withthe Court’s longstanding reliance on history and precedent todetermine the meaning of vague constitutional text. Hellerrested on “constitutional text and history,” ante, at 6(quotation marks omitted), and laid the foundation forMcDonald and then Bruen.In today’s case, the Court carefully builds on Heller,McDonald, and Bruen. The Court applies the historicaltest that those precedents have set forth—namely, “whether the newlaw is relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understoodto permit.” Ante, at 7 (quotation marks omitted). The Courtexamines “our historical tradition of firearm regulation,”ante, at 6 (quotation marks omitted), and correctly holdsthat America’s “tradition of firearm regulation allows theGovernment to disarm individuals who present a credible threat tothe physical safety of others,” ante, at 16. The law beforeus “fits neatly within the tradition the surety and going armedlaws represent.” Ante, at 13–14.As the Court’s decision today notes, Second Amendmentjurisprudence is still in the relatively early innings, unlike theFirst, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments, for example. That is becausethe Court did not have occasion to recognize the Second Amendment’sindividual right until recently. See generally Heller v.District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269–1296 (CADC 2011)(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Deciding constitutional cases in astill-developing area of this Court’s jurisprudence can sometimesbe difficult. But that is not a permission slip for a judge to letconstitutional analysis morph into policy preferences under theguise of a balancing test that churns out the judge’s own policybeliefs.*  *  *As exemplified by Heller, McDonald, Bruen,and the Court’s opinion today, constitutional interpretationproperly takes account of text, pre-ratification andpost-ratification history, and precedent. Those are the tools ofthe trade for an American judge interpreting the AmericanConstitution. Of course, difficult subsidiary questions can ariseabout how to apply those tools, both generally and in particularcases. And in some cases, text, history, and precedent may point insomewhat different directions. In law as in life, nothing isperfect. But in Second Amendment cases as in other constitutionalcases, text, history, and precedent must remain paramount.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–915_________________UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEY RAHIMIon writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals forthe fifth circuit[June 21, 2024]Justice Jackson, concurring.This case tests our Second Amendment jurisprudence as shaped inparticular by New York State Rifle Pistol Assn., Inc. v.Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). I disagree with the methodology ofthat decision; I would have joined the dissent had I been a Memberof the Court at that time. See generally id., at 83–133(Breyer, J., dissenting). But Bruen is now binding law.Today’s decision fairly applies that precedent, so I join theopinion in full.I write separately because we now have two years’ worth ofpost-Bruen cases under our belts, and the experiences ofcourts applying its history-and-tradition test should bear on ourassessment of the workability of that legal standard. This casehighlights the apparent difficulty faced by judges on the ground.Make no mistake: Today’s effort to clear up “misunderst[andings],”ante, at 7, is a tacit admission that lower courts arestruggling. In my view, the blame may lie with us, not withthem.IThe Court today expounds on the history-and-tradition inquirythat Bruen requires. Ante, at 7–8. We emphasize thatthe Second Amendment is “not ... a law trapped inamber.” Ante, at 7. It “permits more than just thoseregulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791”; indeed,“a challenged regulation [that] does not precisely match itshistorical precursors ... ‘still may be analogousenough to pass constitutional muster.’” Ibid. (quotingBruen, 597 U.S., at 30). Gun regulations need only“comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment.”Ante, at 7–8. These clarifying efforts are welcome, giventhe many questions Bruen left unanswered.When this Court adopts a new legal standard, as we did inBruen, we do not do so in a vacuum. The tests we establishbind lower court judges, who then apply those legal standards tothe cases before them. In my view, as this Court thinks of, andspeaks about, history’s relevance to the interpretation ofconstitutional provisions, we should be mindful that our common-lawtradition of promoting clarity and consistency in the applicationof our precedent also has a lengthy pedigree. So when courtssignal they are having trouble with one of our standards, we shouldpay attention. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio MetropolitanTransit Authority, 469 U.S.528, 538–539 (1985).The message that lower courts are sending now in SecondAmendment cases could not be clearer. They say there is littlemethod to Bruen’s madness.[1] It isn’t just that Bruen’s history-and-traditiontest is burdensome (though that is no small thing to courts withheavier caseloads and fewer resources than we have). The moreworrisome concern is that lower courts appear to be diverging inboth approach and outcome as they struggle to conduct the inquiryBruen requires of them. Scholars report that lower courtsapplying Bruen’s approach have been unable to produce“consistent, principled results,” Brief for Second Amendment LawScholars as Amici Curiae 4, and, in fact, they “have come toconflicting conclusions on virtually every consequential SecondAmendment issue to come before them,” id., at 4–5; see alsoid., at 5–6 (collecting examples). Given this, it appearsindisputable that, after Bruen, “confusion plagu[es] thelower courts.” Id., at 6.IIThis discord is striking when compared to the relative harmonythat had developed prior to Bruen. To be sure, our decisionin District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570 (2008), which first recognized an individual right to keepand bear arms for self-defense, see id., at 628, wasdisruptive in its own way. After all, before Heller, “[t]hemeaning of the Second Amendment ha[d] been considered settled bycourts and legislatures for over two centuries,” and “judges andlegislators ... properly believed ... thatthe Second Amendment did not reach possession of firearms forpurely private activities.” Id., at 676, n.38(Stevens, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, after Heller, lowercourts took up the necessary work of reviewing burdens on thisnewly unearthed right. By the time this Court decided Bruen,every court of appeals evaluating whether a firearm regulation wasconsistent with the Second Amendment did so using a two-stepframework that incorporated means-end scrutiny. See Bruen,597 U.S., at 103 (Breyer, J., dissenting).Rejecting that “two-step approach” as having “one step toomany,” id., at 19, the Bruen majority subbed inanother two-step evaluation. Courts must, first, determine whether“the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.”Id., at 24. If it does, “[t]he government must then justifyits regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with theNation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”Ibid.No one seems to question that “[h]istory has a role to play inSecond Amendment analysis.” Ante, at 4 (Sotomayor, J.,concurring). But, per Bruen, courts evaluating a SecondAmendment challenge must consider history to the exclusion ofall else. This means legislators must locate and produce—andcourts must sift through—troves of centuries-old documentationlooking for supportive historical evidence.[2]This very case provides a prime example of the pitfalls ofBruen’s approach. Having been told that a key marker of aconstitutional gun regulation is “a well-established andrepresentative historical analogue,” Bruen, 597 U.S.,at 30 (emphasis deleted), Rahimi argued below that “there is littleor no historical evidence suggesting disarmament for those whocommitted domestic violence; and there is certainly no tradition ofdisarming people subject to a no-contact order related to domesticviolence.” Supp. Brief for Appellant in No. 21–11001 (CA5),p.15 (emphasis deleted). The Government then proffered whatit maintained were sufficient historical analogues to 18U.S.C. §922(g)(8), including surety and going armedlaws. Supp. Brief for Appellee in No. 21–11001 (CA5), pp.23,n.2, 27–31. But the Fifth Circuit concluded that the federalstatute was unconstitutional because the Government’s analogueswere not “‘relevantly similar.’” 61 F. 4th 443, 460–461(2023).Neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit had the benefit oftoday’s decision, in which we hold that the Government had in factoffered “ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits thedisarmament of individuals who pose a credible threat to thephysical safety of others.” Ante, at 8. But even settingaside whether the historical examples the Government found weresufficiently analogous, just canvassing the universe of historicalrecords and gauging the sufficiency of such evidence is anexceedingly difficult task.[3]Consistent analyses and outcomes are likely to remain elusivebecause whether Bruen’s test is satisfied in a particularcase seems to depend on the suitability of whatever historicalsources the parties can manage to cobble together, as well as thelevel of generality at which a court evaluates thosesources—neither of which we have as yet adequately clarified.And the unresolved questions hardly end there. Who is protectedby the Second Amendment, from a historical perspective? To whatconduct does the Second Amendment’s plain text apply? To whathistorical era (or eras) should courts look to divine a historicaltradition of gun regulation? How many analogues add up to atradition? Must there be evidence that those analogues wereenforced or subject to judicial scrutiny? How much support cannonstatutory sources lend? I could go on—as others have. See,e.g., United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337, 358–360 (CA5 2023) (Higginson, J., concurring) (providinga similarly nonexhaustive list). But I won’t.IIIMaybe time will resolve these and other key questions. Maybeappellate courts, including ours, will find a way to “[b]rin[g]discipline to the increasingly erratic and unprincipled body of lawthat is emerging after Bruen.” J. Blocher E. Ruben,Originalism-by-Analogy and Second Amendment Adjudication, 133 YaleL.J. 99, 174 (2023). Indeed, “[m]any constitutional standardsinvolve undoubted gray areas,” and “it normally might be fair toventure the assumption that case-by-case development [will] lead toa workable standard.” Garcia, 469 U.S., at 540(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). By underscoringthat gun regulations need only “comport with the principlesunderlying the Second Amendment,” ante, at 7–8 (emphasisadded), today’s opinion inches that ball forward.But it is becoming increasingly obvious that there are miles togo.[4] Meanwhile, the Rule ofLaw suffers. That ideal—key to our democracy—thrives on legalstandards that foster stability, facilitate consistency, andpromote predictability. So far, Bruen’s history-focused testticks none of those boxes.*  *  *I concur in today’s decision applying Bruen. But, in myview, the Court should also be mindful of how its legal standardsare actually playing out in real life. We must remember thatlegislatures, seeking to implement meaningful reform for theirconstituents while simultaneously respecting the Second Amendment,are hobbled without a clear, workable test for assessing theconstitutionality of their proposals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 54–57;cf. Bruen, 597 U.S., at 90–91 (Breyer, J.,dissenting). And courts, which are currently at sea when it comesto evaluating firearms legislation, need a solid anchor forgrounding their constitutional pronouncements. The public, too,deserves clarity when this Court interprets our Constitution.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–915_________________UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEY RAHIMIon writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals forthe fifth circuit[June 21, 2024]Justice Barrett, concurring.Despite its unqualified text, the Second Amendment is notabsolute. It codified a pre-existing right, and pre-existing limitson that right are part and parcel of it. District ofColumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570, 595, 627 (2008). Those limits define the scope of “theright to bear arms” as it was originally understood; to identifythem, courts must examine our “historical tradition of firearmregulation.” New York State Rifle Pistol Assn., Inc. v.Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks wherethe right stops and the State’s authority to regulate begins. Aregulation is constitutional only if the government affirmativelyproves that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text andhistorical understanding.” Id., at 26.Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to theSecond Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basicpremises of originalism. The theory is built on two coreprinciples: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at thetime of its ratification and that the “discoverable historicalmeaning ... has legal significance and is authoritativein most circ*mstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A CriticalIntroduction, 82 Ford. L.Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whittington).Ratification is a democratic act that renders constitutional textpart of our fundamental law, see Arts.V, VII, and that text“remains law until lawfully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism:Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L.Rev. 777, 782 (2022). Sofor an originalist, the history that matters most is the historysurrounding the ratification of the text; that backdrop illuminatesthe meaning of the enacted law. History (or tradition) that longpostdates ratification does not serve that function. To be sure,postenactment history can be an important tool. For example, it can“reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s originalmeaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; providepersuasive evidence of the original meaning; and, if staredecisis applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v.Elster, 602 U.S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (Barrett, J.,concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14). But generally speaking,the use of postenactment history requires some justification otherthan originalism simpliciter.In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era,considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century. 597U.S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the scope ofthat inquiry but concluded that the timing question did not matterto Bruen’s holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurringopinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions were aboutthe time period relevant to discerning the Second Amendment’soriginal meaning—for instance, what is the post-1791 cutoff fordiscerning how the Second Amendment was originally understood?Id., at 82 (“How long after ratification may subsequentpractice illuminate original public meaning?”). My doubts werenot about whether “tradition,” standing alone, isdispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s decision should not beunderstood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practicefrom the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaningof the Bill of Rights”). As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of“tradition” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law.Vidal, 602 U.S., at ___–___ (Barrett, J., concurringin part) (slip op., at 13–15). And scattered cases or regulationspulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning of thetext. Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 656–657(2023) (Barrett, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment).“Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositivekind—plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It elucidateshow contemporaries understood the text—for example, the meaning ofthe phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554 U.S., at582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of determining thescope of the pre-existing right that the people enshrined in ourfundamental law.[1]* InRahimi’s case, the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this“original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulationsto identify the contours of the right.Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake ofBruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Mustthe government produce a founding-era relative of the challengedregulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gunregulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of theright?Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understoodBruen to require the former, narrower approach. ButBruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a“regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U.S., at 30. To beconsistent with historical limits, a challenged regulationneed not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides,imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has seriousproblems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to followlate-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped inamber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-eralegislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, therebyadopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Suchassumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens:Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold. See,e.g., 597 U.S., at 28–29 (explaining that theAmendment does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existedin the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the“general definition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added));id., at 30–31 (discussing the “‘sensitiveplaces’” principle that limits the right to public carry);cf. Vidal, 602 U.S., at ___–___ (Barrett, J.,concurring in part) (slip op., at 7–9); Whittington 386 (“Theinsight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of theexpected application, but the apparent rule at play given that suchan application is expected to follow from it”). To be sure, a courtmust be careful not to read a principle at such a high level ofgenerality that it waters down the right. Pulling principle fromprecedent, whether case law or history, is a standard feature oflegal reasoning, and reasonable minds sometimes disagree about howbroad or narrow the controlling principle should be.Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level ofgenerality: “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws haveincluded provisions preventing individuals who threaten physicalharm to others from misusing firearms.” Ante, at 5; see alsoKanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451, 464–465 (CA7 2019)(Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consistent with commonsense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibitdangerous people from possessing guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i)fits well within that principle; therefore, Rahimi’s facialchallenge fails. Harder level-of-generality problems can awaitanother day.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–915_________________UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEYRAHIMIon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the fifth circuit[June 21, 2024]Justice Thomas, dissenting.After New York State Rifle & PistolAssn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), this Court’sdirective was clear: A firearm regulation that falls within theSecond Amendment’s plain text is unconstitutional unless it isconsistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearmregulation. Not a single historical regulation justifies thestatute at issue, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8). Therefore, Irespectfully dissent.ISection 922(g)(8) makes it unlawful for anindividual who is subject to a civil restraining order to possessfirearms or ammunition. To trigger §922(g)(8)’s prohibition, arestraining order must bear three characteristics. First, the orderissues after a hearing where the accused “received actual notice”and had “an opportunity to participate.” §922(g)(8)(A). Second, theorder restrains the accused from engaging in threatening behavioragainst an intimate partner or child. §922(g)(8)(B). Third, theorder has either “a finding that [the accused] represents acredible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner orchild,” or an “explici[t] prohibit[ion]” on “the use, attempteduse, or threatened use of physical force against [an] intimatepartner or child.” §922(g)(8)(C). If those three characteristicsare present, §922(g)(8) automatically bans the individual subjectto the order from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.”§922(g).Just as important as §922(g)(8)’s express termsis what it leaves unsaid. Section 922(g)(8) does not require afinding that a person has ever committed a crime of domesticviolence. It is not triggered by a criminal conviction or aperson’s criminal history, unlike other §922(g) subsections. See§§922(g)(1), (9). And, §922(g)(8) does not distinguish contestedorders from joint orders—for example, when parties voluntarilyenter a no-contact agreement or when both parties seek arestraining order.In addition, §922(g)(8) strips an individual ofhis ability to possess firearms and ammunition without any dueprocess.[1] Rather, the ban isan automatic, uncontestable consequence of certain orders. See§922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any [qualifying] person [to]possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition”).There is no hearing or opportunity to be heard on the statute’sapplicability, and a court need not decide whether a person shouldbe disarmed under §922(g)(8). The only process §922(g)(8) requiresis that provided (or not) for the underlying restrainingorder.Despite §922(g)(8)’s broad scope and lack ofprocess, it carries strong penalties. Any violation of §922(g)(8)is a felony punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment. §924(a)(8);see also ante, at 3. And, a conviction for violating§922(g)(8) itself triggers a permanent, life-long prohibition onpossessing firearms and ammunition. See §922(g)(1).In 2020, Zackey Rahimi and his ex-girlfriend,C.M., entered into a qualifying civil restraining order. App.1. C.M. had requested the order and asserted that Rahimiassaulted her. See id., at 2. Because the order found thatRahimi presented a credible threat and prohibited him from usingphysical force against C.M., the order automaticallytriggered §922(g)(8)’s firearms ban. A year later, officersdiscovered firearms in Rahimi’s home. Rahimi pleaded guilty toviolating §922(g)(8).Before his guilty plea, Rahimi challenged hisconviction under the Second Amendment. He pointed to District ofColumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570 (2008), which held that the Second Amendment protects anindividual right to keep and bear firearms. Section 922(g)(8),Rahimi argued, violates that right by penalizing firearmspossession. The District Court rejected Rahimi’s claim. At thattime, the Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, applied aform of means-end scrutiny to Second Amendment claims. See,e.g., United States v. McGinnis, 956F.3d 747, 753–754 (2020). Applying Circuit precedent, the FifthCircuit affirmed the District Court. 2022 WL 2070392 (2022).Roughly two weeks later, this Court issued itsopinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.Bruen. The Court rejected the means-end-scrutiny approachand laid out the appropriate framework for assessing whether afirearm regulation is constitutional. Bruen, 597 U.S.,at 17–19. That framework requires the Government to prove that the“regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits theouter bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id., at19. The Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion to apply the correctframework to Rahimi’s claim. Relying on Bruen, the FifthCircuit concluded that the Government failed to present historicalevidence that §922(g)(8) “fits within our Nation’s historicaltradition of firearm regulation.” 61 F. 4th 443, 460 (2023). TheFifth Circuit, accordingly, vacated Rahimi’s conviction. We grantedcertiorari. 600 U.S. ___ (2023).IIThe Second Amendment provides that “[a] wellregulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not beinfringed.” As the Court recognizes, Bruen provides theframework for analyzing whether a regulation such as §922(g)(8)violates the Second Amendment’s mandate. “[W]hen the SecondAmendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, theConstitution presumptively protects that conduct.” 597 U.S.,at 17. To overcome this presumption, “the government mustdemonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’shistorical tradition of firearm regulation.” Ibid. Thepresumption against restrictions on keeping and bearing firearms isa central feature of the Second Amendment. That Amendment does notmerely narrow the Government’s regulatory power. It is a barrier,placing the right to keep and bear arms off limits to theGovernment.When considering whether a modern regulation isconsistent with historical regulations and thus overcomes thepresumption against firearms restrictions, our precedents “pointtoward at least two metrics [of comparison]: how and why theregulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armedself-defense.” Id., at 29. A historical law must satisfyboth considerations to serve as a comparator. See ibid.While a historical law need not be a “historical twin,” it must be“well-established and representative” to serve as a historicalanalogue. Id., at 30 (emphasis deleted).In some cases, “the inquiry [is] fairlystraightforward.” Id., at 26. For instance, “when achallenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that haspersisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similarhistorical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidencethat the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the SecondAmendment. Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societalproblem, but did so through materially different means, that alsocould be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.”Id., at 26–27.The Court employed this “straightforward”analysis in Heller and Bruen. Hellerconsidered the District of Columbia’s “flat ban on the possessionof handguns in the home,” Bruen, 597 U.S., at 27, andBruen considered New York’s effective ban on carrying afirearm in public, see id., at 11–13. The Court determinedthat the District of Columbia and New York had “addressed aperceived societal problem—firearm violence in densely populatedcommunities—and [they] employed a regulation ... thatthe Founders themselves could have adopted to confront thatproblem.” Id., at 27. Accordingly, the Court “consider[ed]‘founding-era historical precedent’” and looked for acomparable regulation. Ibid. (quoting Heller, 554U.S., at 631). In both cases, the Court found no such law andheld the modern regulations unconstitutional. Id., at 631;Bruen, 597 U.S., at 27.Under our precedent, then, we must resolve twoquestions to determine if §922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment:(1)Does §922(g)(8) target conduct protected by the SecondAmendment’s plain text; and (2)does the Government establishthat §922(g)(8) is consistent with the Nation’s historicaltradition of firearm regulation?IIISection 922(g)(8) violates the SecondAmendment. First, it targets conduct at the core of the SecondAmendment—possessing firearms. Second, the Government failed toproduce any evidence that §922(g)(8) is consistent with theNation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. To thecontrary, the founding generation addressed the same societalproblem as §922(g)(8) through the “materially different means” ofsurety laws. Id., at 26.AIt is undisputed that §922(g)(8) targetsconduct encompassed by the Second Amendment’s plain text. Afterall, the statute bans a person subject to a restraining order frompossessing or using virtually any firearm or ammunition. §922(g)(prohibiting covered individuals from “possess[ing]” or“receiv[ing] any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped ortransported in interstate or foreign commerce”). A coveredindividual cannot even possess a firearm in his home forself-defense, “the central component of the [ Second Amendment]right itself.” Heller, 554 U.S., at 599 (emphasisdeleted). There is no doubt that §922(g)(8) is irreconcilable withthe Second Amendment’s text. Id., at 628–629.It is also undisputed that the Second Amendmentapplies to Rahimi. By its terms, the Second Amendment extends to“‘the people,’” and that “term unambiguously refers toall members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”Id., at 580. The Second Amendment thus recognizes a right“guaranteed to ‘all Americans.’” Bruen, 597U.S., at 70 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S., at 581).Since Rahimi is a member of the political community, he fallswithin the Second Amendment’s guarantee.BThe Government fails to carry its burden ofproving that §922(g)(8) is “consistent with the Nation’s historicaltradition of firearm regulation.” 597 U.S., at 24. Despitecanvassing laws before, during, and after our Nation’s founding,the Government does not identify even a single regulation with ananalogous burden and justification.[2]The Government’s failure is unsurprising giventhat §922(g)(8) addresses a societal problem—the risk ofinterpersonal violence—“that has persisted since the 18th century,”yet was addressed “through [the] materially different means” ofsurety laws. Id., at 26. Surety laws were, in a nutshell, afine on certain behavior. If a person threatened someone in hiscommunity, he was given the choice to either keep the peace orforfeit a sum of money. Surety laws thus shared the samejustification as §922(g)(8), but they imposed a far less onerousburden. The Government has not shown that §922(g)(8)’s more severeapproach is consistent with our historical tradition of firearmregulation.1The Government does not offer a singlehistorical regulation that is relevantly similar to §922(g)(8). Asthe Court has explained, the “central considerations” whencomparing modern and historical regulations are whether theregulations “impose a comparable burden” that is “comparablyjustified.” Id., at 29. The Government offers only twocategories of evidence that are even within the ballpark of§922(g)(8)’s burden and justification: English laws disarmingpersons “dangerous” to the peace of the kingdom, and commentarydiscussing peaceable citizens bearing arms. Neither categoryultimately does the job.iThe Government points to various English lawsfrom the late 1600s and early 1700s to argue that there is atradition of restricting the rights of “dangerous” persons. Forexample, the Militia Act of 1662 authorized local officials todisarm individuals judged “dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdome.”14 Car. 2 c. 3, §13. And, in the early 1700s, the Crown authorizedlords and justices of the peace to “cause search to be made forarms in the possession of any persons whom they judge dangerous,and seize such arms according to law.” Calendar of State PapersDomestic: William III, 1700–1702, p.234 (E. Bateson ed. 1937)(Calendar William III).At first glance, these laws targeting“dangerous” persons might appear relevant. After all, if the SecondAmendment right was historically understood to allow an official todisarm anyone he deemed “dangerous,” it may follow that modernCongresses can do the same. Yet, historical context compels theopposite conclusion. The Second Amendment stems from Englishresistance against “dangerous” person laws.The sweeping disarmament authority wielded byEnglish officials during the 1600s, including the Militia Act of1662, prompted the English to enshrine an individual right to keepand bear arms. “[T]he Stuart Kings Charles II and James IIsucceeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppresspolitical dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents.”Heller, 554 U.S., at 592. Englishmen, as a result,grew “to be extremely wary of concentrated military forces run bythe state and to be jealous of their arms.” Id., at 593.Following the Glorious Revolution, they “obtained an assurance... in the Declaration of Right (which was codified asthe English Bill of Rights), that Protestants would never bedisarmed.” Ibid.The English Bill of Rights “has long beenunderstood to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment.”Ibid. In fact, our Founders expanded on it and made theSecond Amendment even more protective of individual liberty. TheEnglish Bill of Rights assured Protestants “Arms for theirDefence,” but only where “suitable to their Conditions and asallowed by Law.” 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 2, (1688), in 6 Statutes ofthe Realm 143. The Second Amendment, however, contains no suchqualifiers and protects the right of “the people” generally. Inshort, laws targeting “dangerous” persons led to the SecondAmendment. It would be passing strange to permit the Government toresurrect those selfsame “dangerous” person laws to chip away atthat Amendment’s guarantee.Even on their own terms, laws targeting“dangerous” persons cannot support §922(g)(8). Those laws weredriven by a justification distinct from that of §922(g)(8)—quashingtreason and rebellion. The Stuart Kings’ reign was marked byreligious and political conflict, which at that time were often oneand the same. The Parliament of the late 1600s “re-established anintolerant episcopalian church” through legislation targeting othersects, including “[a] fierce penal code” to keep those other sectsout of local government and “to criminalize nonconformist worship.”Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution 212 (M. Braddick ed.2015) (Oxford Handbook); see G. Clark, The Later Stuarts 1660–1714,p. 22 (2d ed. 1955). These laws were driven in large part by adesire to suppress rebellion. “Nonconformist ministers were thoughtto preach resistance to divinely ordained monarchs.” OxfordHandbook 212; see Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II,1661–1662, p.161 (M. Green ed. 1861) (Calendar Charles II)(“[P]reachers go about from county to county, and blow the flamesof rebellion”). Various nonconformist insurrections gavecredibility to these fears. See, e.g., Clark, The LaterStuarts, at 22; Privy Council to Lord Newport (Mar. 4, 1661), inTransactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural HistorySociety, Pt. 2, 3d Ser., Vol. 4, p. 161 (1904).It is in this turbulent context that the Englishkings permitted the disarming of “dangerous persons.” English lordsfeared that nonconformists—i.e., people with“‘wicked and Rebellious Principles’”—had“‘furnished themselves with quantities of Arms, andAmmunition’” “‘to put in Execution their Trayterusdesigns.’” Privy Council to Lord Newport (Jan. 8, 1660), inid., at 156; see Calendar Charles II 541 (“The fanatics... are high and insolent, and threaten all loyalpeople; they will soon be in arms”). In response, the Crown tookmeasures to root out suspected rebels, which included “disarm[ing]all factious and seditious spirits.” Id., at 538 (Nov. 1,1662). For example, following “turbulency and difficulties” arisingfrom the Conventicles Act of 1670, which forbade religiousnonconformists from assembling, the lord mayor of London pressedthat “a special warrant or commission [was] necessary” empoweringcommissioners to “resist, fight, kill, and execute such rebels.”Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1670, p. 236 (May 25,1670) (M. Green ed. 1895) (emphasis deleted). King Charles IIordered the lord mayor “to make strict search in the city andprecincts for dangerous and disaffected persons, seize and securethem and their arms, and detain them in custody till our furtherpleasure.” Id., at 237 (May 26, 1670).History repeated itself a few decades later. In1701, King William III declared that “great quantities of arms, andother provisions of war” had been discovered in the hands of“papists and other disaffected persons, who disown [the]government,” and that such persons had begun to assemble “in greatnumbers ... in the cities of London and Westminster.”Calendar William III 233. He ordered the lord mayor of London andthe justices of the peace to “secur[e] the government” by disarming“any persons whom they judge[d] dangerous,” including “any papist,or reputed papist.” Id., at 233–234 (emphasis deleted).Similar disarmaments targeting “Papists and Non-jurors dangerous tothe peace of the kingdom” continued into the 1700s. Privy Councilto the Earl of Carlisle (July 30, 1714), in Historical ManuscriptsComm’n, Manuscripts of the Earl of Westmoreland etal. 10thReport, Appx., Pt. 4, p. 343 (1885). As before, disarmament wasdesigned to stifle “wicked conspirac[ies],” such as “raising aRebellion in this Kingdom in favour of a Popish Pretender.” LordLonsdale to Deputy Lieutenants of Cumberland (May 20, 1722), inHistorical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of the Earl ofCarlisle, 15th Report, Appx., Pt. 6, pp. 39–40 (1897).While the English were concerned aboutpreventing insurrection and armed rebellion, §922(g)(8) isconcerned with preventing interpersonal violence. “Dangerous”person laws thus offer the Government no support.iiThe Government also points to historicalcommentary referring to the right of “peaceable” citizens to carryarms. It principally relies on commentary surrounding two failedconstitutional proposals.[3]First, at the Massachusetts convention, Samuel Adams unsuccessfullyproposed that the Bill of Rights deny Congress the power “toprevent the people of the United States, who are peaceablecitizens, from keeping their own arms.” 6 Documentary History ofthe Ratification of the Constitution 1453 (J. Kaminski & G.Saladino eds. 2000) (Documentary History). Second, Anti-Federalistsat the Pennsylvania convention unsuccessfully proposed a Bill ofRights providing a “right to bear arms for the defense ofthemselves and their own state, or the United States, or for thepurpose of killing game.” 2 id., at 597–598, ¶7 (M. Jensened. 1976). The Anti-Federalists’ Bill of Rights would also statethat “no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any ofthem, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injuryfrom individuals.” Id., at 598.These proposals carry little interpretativeweight. To begin with, it is “dubious to rely on [drafting] historyto interpret a text that was widely understood to codify apre-existing right.” Heller, 554 U.S., at 603.Moreover, the States rejected the proposals. Samuel Adams withdrewhis own proposal after it “alarmed both Federalists andAntifederalists.” 6 Documentary History 1453 (internal quotationmarks omitted).[4] ThePennsylvania Anti-Federalists’ proposal similarly failed to gain amajority of the state convention. 2 B. Schwartz, The Bill ofRights: A Documentary History 628 (1971).The Government never explains why or howlanguage excluded from the Constitution could operate tolimit the language actually ratified. The more natural inferenceseems to be the opposite—the unsuccessful proposals suggest thatthe Second Amendment preserves a more expansive right. After all,the Founders considered, and rejected, any textual limitations infavor of an unqualified directive: “[T]he right of the people tokeep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”In addition to the proposals, the Governmentthrows in a hodgepodge of sources from the mid-to-late 1800s thatuse the phrase “peaceable” in relation to firearms. Many of thesources simply make passing reference to the notion. See,e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2, p. 229 (1866) (proposed circular explaining freed slaves “haveshown by their peaceful and orderly conduct that they can safely betrusted with fire-arms, and they need them to kill game forsubsistence”). Other sources are individual musings on firearmspolicy. See, e.g., The Sale of Pistols, N.Y.Times, June 22, 1874 (advocating for “including pistols in the lawagainst carrying concealed weapons”). Sources that do discussdisarmament generally describe nonpeaceable citizens as those whothreaten the public or government. For example, the Governmentquotes a Union General’s order that “all loyal and peaceablecitizens in Missouri will be permitted to bear arms.” Headquarters,Dept. of the Missouri, General Orders, No. 86 (Aug. 25, 1863), inThe War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records ofthe Union and Confederate Armies, Ser. 1, Vol. 22, Pt. 2, p. 475(1888). Yet, the Government fails to mention that the UnionGeneral’s order addresses the “[l]arge numbers of men... leaving the broken rebel armies ... andreturning to Missouri ... with the purpose of followinga career of plunder and murder.” Id., at 474. The orderprovided that “all those who voluntarily abandon[ed] the rebelcause” could return to Missouri, but only if they “surrender[ed]themselves and their arms,” “[took] the oath of allegiance and[gave] bond for their future good conduct.” Ibid. Bycontrast, “all loyal and peaceable citizens in Missouri w[ere]permitted to bear arms” to “protect themselves from violence” and“aid the troops.” Id., at 475. Thus, the term “loyal andpeaceable” distinguished between the former rebels residing inMissouri who were disarmed to prevent rebellion and those citizenswho would help fight against them.The Government’s smorgasbord of commentaryproves little of relevance, and it certainly does not establish a“historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the rightto keep and bear arms.” Bruen, 597 U.S., at 19.iiiThe Government’s remaining evidence is evenfurther afield. The Government points to an assortment of firearmregulations, covering everything from storage practices to treasonand mental illness. They are all irrelevant for purposes of§922(g)(8). Again, the “central considerations” when comparingmodern and historical regulations are whether they “impose acomparable burden” that is “comparably justified.” Id., at29 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). TheGovernment’s evidence touches on one or none of theseconsiderations.The Government’s reliance on firearm storagelaws is a helpful example. These laws penalized the improperstorage of firearms with forfeiture of those weapons. See,e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. 46, 1782 Mass. Acts pp.119–120. First, these storage laws did not impose a “comparableburden” to that of §922(g)(8). Forfeiture still allows a person tokeep their other firearms or obtain additional ones. It is in noway equivalent to §922(g)(8)’s complete prohibition on owning orpossessing any firearms.In fact, the Court already reached a similarconclusion in Heller. The Court was tasked with comparinglaws imposing “a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon” with theDistrict of Columbia’s ban on keeping functional handguns at homefor self-defense, which was punishable by a year in prison. 554U.S., at 633–634. We explained that the forfeiture laws were“akin to modern penalties for minor public-safety infractions likespeeding or jaywalking.” Id., at 633. Such inconsequentialpunishment would not have “prevented a person in the founding erafrom using a gun to protect himself or his family.” Id., at634. Accordingly, we concluded that the burdens were notequivalent. See id., at 633–634. That analysis applies herein full force. If a small fine and forfeiture is not equivalent tothe District of Columbia’s handgun ban, it certainly falls short of§922(g)(8)’s ban on possessing any firearm.The Government resists the conclusion thatforfeiture is less burdensome than a possession ban, arguing that“[t]he burdens imposed by bans on keeping, bearing, and obtainingarms are all comparable.” Reply Brief 10. But, there is surely adistinction between having no Second Amendment rights andhaving some Second Amendment rights. If self-defense is “thecentral component of the [ Second Amendment] right,” then commonsense dictates that it matters whether you can defend yourself witha firearm anywhere, only at home, or nowhere. Heller, 554U.S., at 599 (emphasis deleted). And, the Government’ssuggestion ignores that we have repeatedly drawn carefuldistinctions between various laws’ burdens. See, e.g.,id., at 632 (explaining that laws that “did not clearlyprohibit loaded weapons ... do not remotely burden theright of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns”); seealso Bruen, 597 U.S., at 48.Our careful parsing of regulatory burdens makessense given that the Second Amendment codifies a right with a“historically fixed meaning.” Id., at 28. Accordingly,history is our reference point and anchor. If we stray too far fromit by eliding material differences between historical and modernlaws, we “risk endorsing outliers that our ancestors would neverhave accepted.” Id., at 30 (internal quotation marks andalteration omitted).Second, the Government offers no “comparablejustification” between laws punishing firearm storage practices and§922(g)(8). It posits that both laws punish persons whose “conductsuggested that he would not use [firearms] responsibly.” Brief forUnited States 24. The Government, however, does not even attempt toground that justification in historical evidence. See infra,at 28–29.The Government’s proposed justification is alsofar too general. Nearly all firearm regulations can be cast aspreventing “irresponsible” or “unfit” persons from accessingfirearms. In addition, to argue that a law limiting access tofirearms is justified by the fact that the regulated groups shouldnot have access to firearms is a logical merry-go-round. As theCourt has made clear, such overly broad judgments cannot suffice.In Bruen, New York claimed it could effectively ban publiccarry because “the island of Manhattan [is] a ‘sensitiveplace.’” 597 U.S., at 31. New York defined a “sensitiveplace” as “all places where people typically congregate and wherelaw-enforcement and other public-safety professionals arepresumptively available.” Id., at 30–31 (internal quotationmarks omitted). The Court rejected that definition as “far toobroa[d]” as it “would in effect exempt cities from the SecondAmendment and would eviscerate the general right to publicly carryarms for self-defense.” Id., at 31. Likewise, calling amodern and historical law comparably justified because they bothprevent unfit persons from accessing firearms would render ourcomparable-justification inquiry toothless.[5]In sum, the Government has not identified anyhistorical regulation that is relevantly similar to §922(g)(8).2This dearth of evidence is unsurprisingbecause the Founders responded to the societal problem ofinterpersonal violence through a less burdensome regime: suretylaws. Tracing back to early English history, surety laws were apreventative mechanism for ensuring an individual’s futurepeaceable conduct. See D. Feldman, The King’s Peace, the RoyalPrerogative and Public Order, 47 Cambridge L. J. 101, 101–102(1988); M. Dalton, The Countrey Justice 140–144 (1619). If someonereceived a surety demand, he was required to go to a court orjudicial officer with one or more members of thecommunity—i.e., sureties—and comply with certainconditions. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England249–250 (1769) (Blackstone). Specifically, the person providingsureties was required to “keep the peace: either generally... or ... with regard to the person whocrave[d] the security” until a set date. Id., at 250. If hekept the peace, the surety obligation dissolved on thatpredetermined date. See ibid. If, however, he breached thepeace before that date, he and his sureties would owe a set sum ofmoney. See id., at 249–250. Evidence suggests that suretieswere readily available. Even children, who “[we]re incapable ofengaging themselves to answer any debt,” could still find “securityby their friends.” Id., at 251.There is little question that surety lawsapplied to the threat of future interpersonal violence. “[W]hereverany private man [had] just cause to fear, that another w[ould] burnhis house, or do him a corporal injury, by killing, imprisoning, orbeating him ... he [could] demand surety of the peaceagainst such person.” Id., at 252; see also J. Backus, TheJustice of the Peace 25 (1816) (providing for sureties when aperson “stands in fear of his life, or of some harm to be done tohis person or his estate” (emphasis deleted)).Surety demands were also expressly available toprevent domestic violence. Surety could be sought by “a wifeagainst her husband who threatens to kill her or beat heroutrageously, or, if she have notorious cause to fear he will doeither.” Id., at 24; see 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown253 (6th ed. 1777) (“[I]t is certain, that a wife may demand [asurety] against her husband threatening to beat her outrageously,and that a husband also may have it against his wife”). The rightto demand sureties in cases of potential domestic violence wasrecognized not only by treatises, but also the founding-era courts.Records from before and after the Second Amendment’s ratificationreflect that spouses successfully demanded sureties when theyfeared future domestic violence. See, e.g., Records of theCourts of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas of Bucks County,Pennsylvania, 1684–1700, pp. 80–81 (1943) (detailing suretydemanded upon allegations that a husband was “abusive to [his wife]that she was afraid of her Life & of her Childrns lifes”); seealso Heyn’s Case, 2 Ves. & Bea. 182, 35 Eng. Rep. 288(Ch. 1813) (1822) (granting wife’s request to order her husband whocommitted “various acts of ill usage and threats” to “findsufficient sureties”); Anonymous, 1 S.C.Eq. 113(1785) (order requiring husband to “enter into recognizance... with two sureties ... for keeping thepeace towards the complainant (his wife)”).3Although surety laws shared a commonjustification with §922(g)(8), surety laws imposed a materiallydifferent burden. Critically, a surety demand did not alter anindividual’s right to keep and bear arms. After providing sureties,a person kept possession of all his firearms; could purchaseadditional firearms; and could carry firearms in public andprivate. Even if he breached the peace, the only penalty was thathe and his sureties had to pay a sum of money. 4 Blackstone 250. Todisarm him, the Government would have to take some other action,such as imprisoning him for a crime. See Feldman, 47 CambridgeL.J., at 101.By contrast, §922(g)(8) strips an individual ofhis Second Amendment right. The statute’s breadth cannot beoverstated. For one, §922(g) criminalizes nearly all conductrelated to covered firearms and ammunition. Most fundamentally,possession is prohibited, except in the rarest of circ*mstances.See, e.g., United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d768, 771 (CA11 2010) (percuriam) (concluding that itwas “irrelevant” whether defendant “possessed the handgun forpurposes of self-defense (in his home)”); United States v.Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1162 (CA5 1982) (affirming convictionof a business owner under §922(g) predecessor statute for brieflypossessing a firearm to ward off suspected robbers). Courts ofAppeals have understood “possession” broadly, upholding convictionswhere a person “picked up ... three firearms for a fewseconds to inspect” each, United States v. Matthews,520 F.3d 806, 807 (CA7 2008), or “made direct contact with thefirearm by sitting on it,” United States v. Johnson,46 F.4th 1183, 1189 (CA10 2022). They have also construed§922(g) to bar “constructive possession” of a firearm, including,for example, ammunition found in a jointly occupied home. See,e.g., United States v. Stepp, 89 F.4th 826,832–835 (CA10 2023).Moreover, §922(g) captures virtually allcommercially available firearms and ammunition. It prohibitspossessing a firearm “in or affecting commerce” and “receiv[ing]any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported ininterstate or foreign commerce.” §922(g). As courts haveinterpreted that nexus, if a firearm or ammunition has at any pointcrossed interstate lines, it is regulated by §922(g). SeeScarborough v. United States, 431U.S. 563, 566–567 (1977) (holding §922(g)’s predecessor statutecovered firearm that “had previously traveled in interstatecommerce”); United States v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769, 772 (CA7 2002) (affirming conviction under§922(g) for possessing firearm that “crossed into Wisconsin afterits manufacture at some indeterminate moment in time—possibly yearsbefore it was discovered in [the defendant’s]possession”).[6] In fact, thestatute goes even further by regulating not only ammunition butalso all constituent parts of ammunition—many of which areparts with no dangerous function on their own. See 18U.S.C. §921(a)(17)(A).These sweeping prohibitions are criminallyenforced. To violate the statute is a felony, punishable by up to15 years. §924(a)(8). That felony conviction, in turn, triggers apermanent, life-long prohibition on exercising the Second Amendmentright. See §922(g)(1).The combination of the Government’s sweepingview of the firearms and ammunition within its regulatory reach andthe broad prohibition on any conduct regarding covered firearms andammunition makes §922(g)(8)’s burden unmistakable: The statuterevokes a citizen’s Second Amendment right while the civilrestraining order is in place. And, that revocation is absolute. Itmakes no difference if the covered individual agrees to ano-contact order, posts a bond, or even moves across the countryfrom his former domestic partner—the bar on exercising the SecondAmendment right remains. See United States v. Wilkey,2020 WL 4464668, *1 (D Mont., Aug. 4, 2020) (defendant agreed toFlorida protection order so he could “‘just walk away’”and was prosecuted several years later for possessing firearms inMontana).That combination of burdens places §922(g)(8) inan entirely different stratum from surety laws. Surety lawspreserve the Second Amendment right, whereas §922(g)(8) strips anindividual of that right. While a breach of a surety demand waspunishable by a fine, §922(g)(8) is punishable by a felonyconviction, which in turn permanently revokes an individual’sSecond Amendment right. At base, it is difficult to imagine howsurety laws can be considered relevantly similar to a complete banon firearm ownership, possession, and use.This observation is nothing new; the Court hasalready recognized that surety laws impose a lesser relative burdenon the Second Amendment right. In Bruen, the Court explainedthat surety laws merely “provide financial incentives forresponsible arms carrying.” 597 U.S., at 59. “[A]n accusedarms-bearer ‘could go on carrying without criminal penalty’ so longas he ‘post[ed] money that would be forfeited if he breached thepeace or injured others.’” Id., at 56–57 (quotingWrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661(CADC 2017); alteration in original). As a result, we held thatsurety laws were not analogous to New York’s effective ban onpublic carry. 597 U.S., at 55. That conclusion is damning for§922(g)(8), which burdens the Second Amendment right even more withrespect to covered individuals.Surety laws demonstrate that this case shouldhave been a “straightforward” inquiry. Id., at 27. TheGovernment failed to produce a single historical regulation that isrelevantly similar to §922(g)(8). Rather, §922(g)(8) addresses asocietal problem—the risk of interpersonal violence—“that haspersisted since the 18th century,” yet was addressed “through [the]materially different means” of surety laws. Id., at 26.CThe Court has two rejoinders, surety andaffray laws. Neither is a compelling historical analogue. As I haveexplained, surety laws did not impose a burden comparable to§922(g)(8). And, affray laws had a dissimilar burden andjustification. The Court does not reckon with these vitaldifferences, asserting that the disagreement is whether surety andaffray laws must be an exact copy of §922(g)(8). Ante, at16. But, the historical evidence shows that those laws areworlds—not degrees—apart from §922(g)(8). For this reason, theCourt’s argument requires combining aspects of surety and affraylaws to justify §922(g)(8). This piecemeal approach is not what theSecond Amendment or our precedents countenance.1Despite the foregoing evidence, the Courtinsists that surety laws in fact support §922(g)(8). To makeits case, the Court studiously avoids discussing the full extent of§922(g)(8)’s burden as compared to surety laws. The most the Courtdoes is attack Bruen’s conclusion that surety laws were lessburdensome than a public carry ban. The Court reasons thatBruen dealt with a “broad prohibitory regime” while§922(g)(8) applies to only a subset of citizens. Ante, at15–16. Yet, that was only one way in which Bruendistinguished a public carry ban from surety laws’ burden. True,Bruen noted that, unlike the public carry ban, surety lawsdid not restrict the general citizenry. But, Bruen alsoplainly held that surety laws did not “constitut[e] a ‘severe’restraint on public carry, let alone a restriction tantamount to aban.” 597 U.S., at 59. In fact, that conclusion is repeatedthroughout the opinion. Id., at 55–59 (surety laws “were notbans on public carry”; “surety laws did not prohibitpublic carry”; surety laws “were not viewed as substantialrestrictions on public carry”; and “surety statutes did notdirectly restrict public carry”). Bruen’s conclusion isinescapable and correct. Because surety laws are not equivalent toan effective ban on public carry, they do not impose a burdenequivalent to a complete ban on carrying and possessingfirearms.Next, the Court relies on affray lawsprohibiting “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusualweapons, [to] terrif[y] the good people of the land.” 4 Blackstone149 (emphasis deleted). These laws do not justify §922(g)(8)either. As the Court concedes, why and how a historical regulationburdened the right of armed self-defense are centralconsiderations. Ante, at 7. Affray laws are not a fit oneither basis.First, affray laws had a distinct justificationfrom §922(g)(8) because they regulated only certain public conductthat injured the entire community. An affray was a “commonNusanc[e],” 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, at 135, defined as “thefighting of two or more persons in some public place, to the terrorof his majesty’s subjects,” 4 Blackstone 145. Even though an affraygenerally required “actual violence,” certain other conduct couldsuffice. 1 R. Burn, The Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer 13(2d ed. 1756). As relevant here, an affray included arming oneself“with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as [to]naturally cause a terror to the people”—i.e., “goingarmed.” Ibid. Many postfounding going armed laws had aself-defense exception: A person could “go armed with a[n]... offensive and dangerous weapon” so long as he had“reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury.” Mass. Rev.Stat., ch. 134, §16 (1836); see also 1838 Terr. of Wis. Stat. §16,p. 381; 1851 Terr. of Minn. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §18.Affrays were defined by their public nature andeffect. An affray could occur only in “some public place,” andcaptured only conduct affecting the broader public. 4 Blackstone145. To that end, going armed laws did not prohibit carryingfirearms at home or even public carry generally. See Bruen,597 U.S., at 47–50. Instead, they targeted only public carrythat was “accompanied with such circ*mstances as are apt to terrifythe people.” 1 Burn, Justice of the Peace, at 13; see Bruen,597 U.S., at 50 (explaining that going armed laws “prohibitbearing arms in a way that spreads ‘fear’ or ‘terror’ among thepeople”).Affrays were intentionally distinguished fromassaults and private interpersonal violence on that same basis. SeeCash v. State, 2 Tenn. 198, 199 (1813) (“It isbecause the violence is committed in a public place, and to theterror of the people, that the crime is called an affray, insteadof assault and battery”); Nottingham v. State, 227Md. App. 592, 602, 135 A.3d 541, 547 (Md. 2016) (“[U]nlike assaultand battery,” affray is “not a crime against the person; rather,affray is a crime against the public” (internal quotation marksomitted)). As treatises shortly before the founding explain, “theremay be an Assault which will not amount to an Affray; as where ithappens in a private Place, out of the hearing or seeing of any,except the Parties concerned; in which Case it cannot be said to beto the Terror of the People.” 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown,at 134; see 1 Burn, Justice of the Peace, at 13. Affrays thus didnot cover the very conduct §922(g)(8) seeks toprevent—interpersonal violence in the home.Second, affray laws did not impose a burdenanalogous to §922(g)(8). They regulated a niche subset of SecondAmendment-protected activity. As explained, affray laws prohibitedonly carrying certain weapons (“dangerous and unusual”) in aparticular manner (“terrifying the good people of the land” withouta need for self-defense) and in particular places (in public).Meanwhile, §922(g)(8) prevents a covered person from carrying anyfirearm or ammunition, in any manner, in any place, at any time,and for any reason. Section 922(g)(8) thus bans all SecondAmendment-protected activity. Indeed, this Court has alreadyconcluded that affray laws do not impose a burden “analogous to theburden created by” an effective ban on public carry. Bruen,597 U.S., at 50. Surely, then, a law that imposes a publicand private ban on a covered individual cannot have an analogousburden either.The Court counters that since affray laws“provided for imprisonment,” they imposed a lesser burden than§922(g)(8)’s disarmament. Ante, at 14. But, that argumentserves only to highlight another fundamental difference: Affraylaws were criminal statutes that penalized past behavior, whereas§922(g)(8) is triggered by a civil restraining order that seeks toprevent future behavior. Accordingly, an affray’s burden was vastlyharder to impose. To imprison a person, a State had to prove thathe committed the crime of affray beyond a reasonable doubt. TheConstitution provided a bevy of protections during thatprocess—including a right to a jury trial, counsel, and protectionsagainst double jeopardy. See Amdts. 5, 6.The imposition of §922(g)(8)’s burden, however,has far fewer hurdles to clear. There is no requirement that theaccused has actually committed a crime; instead, he need only beprohibited from threatening or using force, or pose a “crediblethreat” to an “intimate partner or child.” §922(g)(8)(C). Section922(g)(8) thus revokes a person’s Second Amendment right based onthe suspicion that he may commit a crime in the future. Inaddition, the only process required before that revocation is ahearing on the underlying court order. §922(g)(8)(A). During thatcivil hearing—which is not even about §922(g)(8)—a person has fewerconstitutional protections compared to a criminal prosecution foraffray. Gone are the Sixth Amendment’s panoply of rights, includingthe rights to confront witnesses and have assistance of counsel, aswell as the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy.See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S.431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern civilcases”); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.93, 99 (1997) (“The [Double Jeopardy] Clause protects onlyagainst the imposition of multiple criminal punishments forthe same offense”). Civil proceedings also do not require proofbeyond a reasonable doubt, and some States even set aside the rulesof evidence, allowing parties to rely on hearsay. See, e.g.,Wash. Rule Evid. 1101(c)(4) (2024) (providing the state rules ofevidence “need not be applied” to applications for protectionorders (boldface and capitalization deleted)); Cal. Civ. Proc. CodeAnn. §527.6(i) (West Supp. 2024) (judge “shall receive anytestimony that is relevant” and issue order based on clear andconvincing evidence). The differences between criminal prosecutionsand civil hearings are numerous and consequential.Affray laws are wide of the mark. While theSecond Amendment does not demand a historical twin, it requiressomething closer than affray laws, which expressly carve out thevery conduct §922(g)(8) was designed to prevent (interpersonalviolence in the home). Nor would I conclude that affraylaws—criminal laws regulating a specific type of public carry—areanalogous to §922(g)(8)’s use of a civil proceeding to bar allSecond Amendment-protected activity.2The Court recognizes that surety and affraylaws on their own are not enough. So it takes pieces from each tostitch together an analogue for §922(g)(8). Ante, at 13. Ourprecedents foreclose that approach. The question before us iswhether a single historical law has both a comparable burden andjustification as §922(g)(8), not whether several laws can becobbled together to qualify. As Bruen explained,“determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analoguefor a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determinationof whether the two regulations”—the historical and modernregulations—“are ‘relevantly similar.’” 597 U.S., at28–29. In doing so, a court must consider whether that singlehistorical regulation “impose[s] a comparable burden on the rightof armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparablyjustified.” Id., at 29 (emphasis added).The Court’s contrary approach of mixing andmatching historical laws—relying on one law’s burden and anotherlaw’s justification—defeats the purpose of a historical inquiryaltogether. Given that imprisonment (which involved disarmament)existed at the founding, the Government can always satisfy thisnewly minted comparable-burden requirement. See ante, at14–15. That means the Government need only find a historical lawwith a comparable justification to validate modern disarmamentregimes. As a result, historical laws fining certain behavior couldjustify completely disarming a person for the same behavior. Thatis the exact sort of “regulatory blank check” that Bruenwarns against and the American people ratified the Second Amendmentto preclude. 597 U.S., at 30.Neither the Court nor the Government identifiesa single historical regulation with a comparable burden andjustification as §922(g)(8). Because there is none, I wouldconclude that the statute is inconsistent with the SecondAmendment.IVThe Government, for its part, tries to rewritethe Second Amendment to salvage its case. It argues that the SecondAmendment allows Congress to disarm anyone who is not “responsible”and “law-abiding.” Not a single Member of the Court adopts theGovernment’s theory. Indeed, the Court disposes of it in half apage—and for good reason. Ante, at 17. The Government’sargument lacks any basis in our precedents and would eviscerate theSecond Amendment altogether.AThe Government’s position is a bald attempt torefashion this Court’s doctrine. At the outset of this case, theGovernment contended that the Court has already held the SecondAmendment protects only “responsible, law-abiding” citizens. Brieffor United States 6, 11–12. The plain text of the Second Amendmentquashes this argument. The Amendment recognizes “the right of thepeople to keep and bear Arms.” (Emphasis added.) When theConstitution refers to “the people,” the term “unambiguously refersto all members of the political community.” Heller, 554U.S., at 580; see also id., at 581 (beginning itsanalysis with the strong “presumption that the Second Amendmentright ... belongs to all Americans”). The Government’sclaim that the Court already held the Second Amendment protectsonly “law-abiding, responsible citizens” is specious atbest.[7] See ante, at17.At argument, the Government invented yet anotherposition. It explained that when it used the term “responsible” inits briefs, it really meant “not dangerous.” See Tr. of OralArg. 10–11. Thus, it posited that the Second Amendment protectsonly law-abiding and non-dangerous citizens. No matter howmany adjectives the Government swaps out, the fact remains that theCourt has never adopted anything akin to the Government’s test. Inreality, the “law-abiding, dangerous citizen” test is theGovernment’s own creation, designed to justify every one of itsexisting regulations. It has no doctrinal or constitutionalmooring.The Government finally tries to cram itsdangerousness test into our precedents. It argues that §922(g)(8)and its proffered historical laws have a shared justification ofdisarming dangerous citizens. The Government, however, does notdraw that conclusion by examining the historical justification foreach law cited. Instead, the Government simply looks—from a modernvantage point—at the mix of laws and manufactures a possibleconnection between them all. Yet, our task is to “assess whethermodern firearms regulations are consistent with the SecondAmendment’s text and historical understanding.”Bruen, 597 U.S., at 26 (emphasis added). To do so, wemust look at the historical law’s justification as articulatedduring the relevant time period—not at modern post-hocspeculations. See, e.g., id., at 41–42, 48–49;Heller, 554 U.S., at 631–632. As I have explained, ahistorically based study of the evidence reveals that theGovernment’s position is untenable. Supra, at 7–13.As it does today, the Court should continue torebuff the Government’s attempts to rewrite the Second Amendmentand the Court’s precedents interpreting it.BThe Government’s “law-abiding, dangerouscitizen” theory is also antithetical to our constitutionalstructure. At bottom, its test stems from the idea that the SecondAmendment points to general principles, not a historically groundedright. And, it asserts that one of those general principles is thatCongress can disarm anyone it deems “dangerous, irresponsible, orotherwise unfit to possess arms.” Brief for United States 7. Thisapproach is wrong as a matter of constitutional interpretation, andit undermines the very purpose and function of the SecondAmendment.The Second Amendment recognizes a pre-existingright and that right was “enshrined with the scope” it was“understood to have when the people adopted [the Amendment].”Heller, 554 U.S., at 634–635. Only a subsequentconstitutional amendment can alter the Second Amendment’s terms,“whether or not future legislatures or ... even futurejudges think [its original] scope [is] too broad.” Id., at635.Yet, the Government’s “law-abiding, dangerouscitizen” test—and indeed any similar, principle-basedapproach—would hollow out the Second Amendment of any substance.Congress could impose any firearm regulation so long as it targets“unfit” persons. And, of course, Congress would also dictate what“unfit” means and who qualifies. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 51. Thehistorical understanding of the Second Amendment right would beirrelevant. In fact, the Government posits that Congress couldenact a law that the Founders explicitly rejected. See id.,at 18 (agreeing that modern judgment would override“[f]ounding-[e]ra applications”). At base, whether a person couldkeep, bear, or even possess firearms would be Congress’s policychoice under the Government’s test.That would be the direct inverse of theFounders’ and ratifying public’s intent. Instead of a substantiveright guaranteed to every individual against Congress, wewould have a right controlled by Congress. “A constitutionalguarantee subject to future judges’ [or Congresses’] assessments ofits usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”Heller, 554 U.S., at 634. The Second Amendment is “thevery product of an interest balancing by the people.”Id., at 635. It is this policy judgment—not that of modernand future Congresses—“that demands our unqualified deference.”Bruen, 597 U.S., at 26.The Government’s own evidence exemplifies thedangers of approaches based on generalized principles. Before theCourt of Appeals, the Government pointed to colonial statutes“disarming classes of people deemed to be threats, including... slaves, and native Americans.” Supp. Brief forUnited States in No. 21–11001 (CA5), p. 33. It argued that sinceearly legislatures disarmed groups considered to be “threats,” amodern Congress has the same authority. Ibid. The problemwith such a view should be obvious. Far from an exemplar ofCongress’s authority, the discriminatory regimes the Governmentrelied upon are cautionary tales. They warn that when majoritarianinterests alone dictate who is “dangerous,” and thus can bedisarmed, disfavored groups become easy prey. One of many suchexamples was the treatment of freed blacks following the Civil War.“[M]any of the over 180,000 African-Americans who served in theUnion Army returned to the States of the old Confederacy, wheresystematic efforts were made to disarm them and other blacks.”McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.742, 771 (2010). Some “States formally prohibited African-Americans from possessing firearms.” Ibid. And,“[t]hroughout the South, armed parties ... forciblytook firearms from newly freed slaves.” Id., at 772. “In onetown, the marshal took all arms from returned colored soldiers, andwas very prompt in shooting the blacks whenever an opportunityoccurred.” Ibid. (alterations and internal quotation marksomitted). A constitutional amendment was ultimately “necessary toprovide full protection for the rights of blacks.” Id., at775.The Government peddles a modern version of thegovernmental authority that led to those historical evils. Itstheory would allow federal majoritarian interests to determine whocan and cannot exercise their constitutional rights. While Congresscannot revive disarmament laws based on race, one can easilyimagine a world where political minorities or those with disfavoredcultural views are deemed the next “dangers” to society.Thankfully, the Constitution prohibits such laws. The “veryenumeration of the [ Second Amendment] right takes out of the handsof government ... the power to decide on a case-by-casebasis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”Heller, 544 U.S., at 634.The Court rightly rejects the Government’sapproach by concluding that any modern regulation must be justifiedby specific historical regulations. See ante, at 10–15. But,the Court should remain wary of any theory in the future that wouldexchange the Second Amendment’s boundary line—“the right of thepeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”—for vague(and dubious) principles with contours defined by whoever happensto be in power.*  *  *This case is not about whether States candisarm people who threaten others. States have a ready mechanismfor disarming anyone who uses a firearm to threaten physicalviolence: criminal prosecution. Most States, including Texas,classify aggravated assault as a felony, punishable by up to 20years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§22.02(b), 12.33(West 2019 and Supp. 2023). Assuming C.M.’s allegations couldbe proved, Texas could have convicted and imprisoned Rahimi forevery one of his alleged acts. Thus, the question before us is notwhether Rahimi and others like him can be disarmed consistent withthe Second Amendment. Instead, the question is whether theGovernment can strip the Second Amendment right of anyone subjectto a protective order—even if he has never been accused orconvicted of a crime. It cannot. The Court and Government do notpoint to a single historical law revoking a citizen’s SecondAmendment right based on possible interpersonal violence. TheGovernment has not borne its burden to prove that §922(g)(8) isconsistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historicalunderstanding.The Framers and ratifying public understood“that the right to keep and bear arms was essential to thepreservation of liberty.” McDonald, 561 U.S., at 858(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Yet,in the interest of ensuring the Government can regulate one subsetof society, today’s decision puts at risk the Second Amendmentrights of many more. I respectfully dissent.